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WHO DESERVES THE PATENT POT OF GOLD?: AN
INQUIRY INTO THE PROPER INVENTORSHIP OF PATIENT-
BASED DISCOVERIES*
Cynthia M Hd*
INTRODUCTION
There is currently an information-age rush to find and patent all genetic
nuggets of information. The players in this race, primarily corporations
with research interests, see the area of gene patenting as a potential
goldmine.' The first to isolate a new gene or gene sequence and
identify its utility is rewarded a pot of gold with the typical
exclusionary rights conferred by a patent.2 In addition, the perceived
"Copyright 2002, Reprinted with the permission of the HOUSTON JOURNAL OF HEALTH
LAW & POLICY.
..Assistant Professor of Law, Loyola University of Chicago School of Law. I would like
to thank Professor Mary Anne Bobinski for inviting me to participate in this symposium issue.
In addition, thanks to Susan Kuo, Jacqueline Lipton, Angela Upchurch and Neil Williams for
helpful comments on prior drafts of this article. Last, but not least, special thanks to Julie
Fitzgibbons and Heather Nolan for their excellent research assistance. Comments and questions
on this article are welcome at cho@luc.edu.
'See, e.g., Margaret Graham Tebo, The Big Gene Profit Machine, 87 A.B.A. J. 46, 47-48
(Apr. 2001) (describing how the evolution of patent rights in biological material has evolved
into being worth potentially billions of dollars over time). Gene patents are highly valued for
their relevance to commercial products; for example, the patent on the BRCA-l gene that
identifies breast cancer is seen as highly valuable because the patent allows its owner to
essentially exclude all others from using the genetic marker to provide a commercial test
without first paying a license fee. See, e.g., Sheldon Krimsky, The Profit of Scientific
Discovery and its Normative Implication, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 15, 37 (1999) (noting that the
patent on BRCA-1 and BRCA-2 has resulted in screening test costs of about $ 2400).
Moreover, since there are nearly innumerable genes and gene markers, gold-diggers see a
multitude of small gold nuggets that each can lead to riches. See, e.g., Kristen Philipkoski,
Incyte Incites Concern, WIRED NEWS (Feb. 16, 2000), at http://www.wired.con/news/techno
logy/0,1282,34372,00.html (noting plans to file patent applications on 15,000 gene sequences);
Kristen Philiposki, Celera a Cinch in Patent Race, WIRED NEWS (Jan. 11, 2000), at
http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,33551,00.html; Ronald Kotulak, Taking License with
Your Genes, Biotech Firms Say They Need Protection, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 12, 1999, at C I
[hereinafter "Taking License with Your Genes"] (discussing Amgen's estimated $ 100 million
patent on an important blood forming hormone discovery).2See infra notes 22-27 and accompanying text (explaining the patentability of genes and
gene sequences).
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value of these sequences is further enhanced because the stock market
and popular press tend to exalt the discovery of each speck of gold as if
it were a discovery of an actual cure.' However, as in a traditional case
of gold-digging, there is a discrete amount of rare, valuable material
that is embedded amidst much more useless information.4 Luck
typically plays a role; a select few who persevere to comb through
material are rewarded with gold, although those rewarded are not
necessarily those who worked the hardest.
The fortunes of some genetic gold-diggers are substantially
enhanced by interactions with certain patients.' In particular, some
patients may contribute unique genetic material that essentially
provides a short-cut to where the gold lies.6 Patients typically provide
this valuable information without any knowledge that they are helping
gold-diggers who will be unlikely to share the eventual pot of gold. In
addition, even after patients realize that there is a pot of gold at stake,
they are usually unsuccessful in getting a fair share of any nuggets of
gold under the current patent law. Moreover, although patients who
help pave the way to genetic gold usually do so for altruistic reasons,
such as accelerating the discovery of a cure, they ironically become
unwitting accessories to a situation where they, and other patients, will
be precluded from the results of their help if a patent is obtained. This
occurs because a patent owner has the right to prevent all others from
encroaching on the patented invention; most patent owners today,
including academic institutions and hospitals, utilize this right to charge
higher prices for patented inventions, including new medicines or
'See, e.g., Michael Waldholz, Genes are Patentable; Less Clear is if Finder Must Know
Their Role: AIDS Discovery Spurs Some to Challenge a Filing that Boosted HGS Stock, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 16, 2000 at Al (noting that when investors believed that HGS was the sole
discoverer of a breakthrough in AIDS research, its shares rose tremendously).
'In the case of gene patents, scientists must remove much "junk DNA" to reach isolated
and purified material that can then be potentially patentable. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Intellectual Property at the Public-Private Divide: The Case of Large-Scale DNA Sequencing, 3
U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 557, 558 (1996) (explaining how complementary DNA sequences
are created through the use of enzymes to redact "junk DNA"); Dorothy R. Auth, Are Ests
Patentable, 15 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 911, 912 (1997) (describing the practice of patenting
portions of DNA with no known function).
'For the purposes of this article, gold-diggers include both those who intentionally seek
out genetic patents using patient contributors, as well as those who seek patents more
generically, but have no qualms about patenting the results based upon patient contributors
without any recognition or compensation to these contributors. In some cases, the gold-diggers
are not necessarily maliciously, denying rights to patients; rather, because of the complex
dynamics of research and patent licensing, gold-diggers with patent rights often have no
personal contact with the contributing patients. See infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text
(contrasting patient perspectives with research realities, including the commercial overtones).6See infra notes 42-43 (describing how researchers have sought out isolated populations
because their limited genetic diversity accelerates the progress of research).
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medical treatments.7 In addition, while the patent owner's right of
exclusion has been traditionally justified as an incentive or a reward to
those who discover patentable information that is then shared with
society, this reward seems perverse to patients who believe that they
contributed just as much, if not more, towards the pot of gold.8
Accordingly, patient contributors are left feeling like they are tour
guides to the land of gold, but always excluded from the rewards
reaped by those who follow them.
This article focuses on the current clash between patient
perspectives and patent law, with respect to who should be entitled to
the pot of gold that lies in patent rights. The focus on patient
contributors advances the important issue regarding appropriate
compensation, as well as whether current patent law definitions of
inventorship and ownership are outdated. This article provides an
important foundation of underlying issues, and explains the present
failure of the patent system to accommodate and provide incentives to
the patients who offer the unique ability to facilitate research.
Although this article addresses potential short-term solutions under
patent and contract law, it takes an important step beyond prior
scholarship by drawing from multiple disciplines to promote an
enduring and satisfying solution for patient contributors.9
Part I of this article begins with an introduction to patent laws and
underlying policies to provide a basic foundation for the pertinent legal
issues. Part II then highlights the present dichotomy between the
7See 35 U.S.C. 271(a) (1994) (noting that patent owner has the right to exclude others
from the patented invention); see also infra notes 53-63 and accompanying text (describing
patient perceptions).
8See infra notes 56-68 and accompanying text (describing patient perceptions that they
made substantial contributions to the patented invention). However, it should be noted that in
the area of biotechnology, patents, as well as the high prices of patented medicines have often
been justified because of enormous research and development costs in this area. Ceci Connolly,
Price Tag for a NewDrug: $ 802 Million, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 2001, at A10 (noting that Tufts
University researchers recently calculated the cost of developing a new drug to reach $ 802
million, whereas another consumer group alleges the numbers are less than $ 300 million).
Nonetheless, where patients provide a genetic short cut, they are at least arguably reducing the
costs for companies, with no personal gain to themselves.
'For prior proposals suggesting immediate reform, see Marty Taylor Danforth, Note,
Cells, Sales, and Royalties: The Patient's Right to a Portion of the Profits, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 179, 193-95 (1988) (proposing a licensing scheme with a fixed fee set by Congress); Roy
Hardiman, Note, Toward the Right of Commerciality." Recognizing Property Rights in the
Commercial Value of Human Tissue, 34 UCLA L. REV. 207, 263 (1986) (advocating creating
property rights in the human body); Christopher S. Pennisi, Note, More on Moore: A Novel
Strategy for Compensating the Human Sources of Patentable Cell-Line Inventions Based on
Existing Law, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 747, 778 (2001) (proposing a
right to compensation based upon the "shop right doctrine" under patent law, or an alternative
informed consent procedure). See also Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy and the Human Body,
80 B.U. L. REV. 358, 459-60 (2000) (concluding that the property and privacy interests in
human body parts are applicable differently to living and deceased persons).
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perspectives of patients with the present research reality, including the
prominent role of patents. After fully describing the backdrop of the
situation, Part III explains the legal implications of patient
contributions under the present patent law. Section A begins by
underscoring the importance of the inventorship concept in United
States patent law. Then, Section B addresses the current law governing
inventorship to explain why patient efforts in assisting with gold-
digging have yet to provide them with the actual gold that inures to
joint inventors.
This article then turns to potential methods of addressing patients'
concerns in Part IV. Section A begins by considering whether an
extension of joint inventorship law to include patients would
adequately address patient concerns first articulated within Part II. This
section suggests that underlying policies of patent law as well as joint
inventorship could be interpreted to embrace patient contributors.
However, this section concludes that including patients as joint
inventors may nonetheless fail to provide patient contributors with a
desired result because of a potential change in patent law. After
concluding that joint inventorship may not address patient concerns
completely, section B considers whether a contractual approach would
be realistic. However, this section ultimately concludes that although
patients can attempt to individually negotiate their preferences, this
approach is unlikely to provide most patients with a workable solution.
Section C then considers whether the sanction of an unenforceable
patent could address patient concerns.
Section D moves beyond the short-term solutions to suggest a
more comprehensive view of the problem. In particular, this section
suggests specific areas that have analogous problems to the patient
contributor issue, as a means towards reaching solutions that will be
longer lasting and more efficacious. For example, this section raises
the analogous issue of scientific authorship in an era where it is often
difficult to provide proper credit to all contributors. In addition, the
patient contributor problems are analogized to those of database
creators, in considering whether the sui generis approach of the
database creators would be helpful. Also, a comparison of patient
contributor problems with the long-standing problem of industrial use
of indigenous resources, often referred to as "bio-piracy," will be
sketched briefly to highlight another area upon which patient advocates
may consider in formulating a new-order solution. Finally, this section
returns to patent law approaches, but suggests a broadened perspective
of inventorship that considers not only patient contributors, but
appropriate inventorship of all isolated genetic material, regardless of
how it was derived.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Patent Law and Policy
United States patent laws and policy are founded upon the Constitution,
which authorizes Congress to "promote the progress of science and
useful arts by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries."' °
Consistent with this mandate, Congress enacted the Patent Act, which
gives inventors a right of exclusivity in the form of patent protection if
certain requirements are met. In particular, a patent provides an
inventor with the right to exclude all others from use of the invention
during the term of the patent." Exclusivity is considered essential in
order to "stimulate ideas and the eventual development of further
significant advances."' 2 The requirements for patentability under the
Patent Act are similarly intended to fulfill the constitutional mandate of
promoting innovation."
The Patent Act requires that for an invention to be patentable it
must (1) constitute "patentable subject matter," (2) meet the technical
requirements for patentability, which require that the invention be
"new," "useful," and "nonobvious,"' 4 and (3) disclose a written
description of an invention, including the best mode of carrying it
forth. '5 Although a patent must disclose an invention that fits within at
least one statutory class of subject matter, the classes are very broad
and expansively interpreted to effectuate the policy of promoting
innovation. 6 The technical requirements are intended to ensure that the
exclusive right is only provided in cases where an invention will be of
'°U.S. CONST. art. I, 8, cl. 8.
"See Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109 (1790) ("An Act to Promote the Progress of Useful
Arts."); see also EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS:
AMERICAN PATENT LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, 1798-1836, at 35-36 (1998) (noting that the
framers elected for a system of providing exclusive rights, rather than other types of rewards
known at the time such as medals, titles or bounties).
'
2See, e.g., Kewanee Oil v. Bicron, 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974).
"See, e.g., Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 156 (1989).
'
4See 35 U.S.C. 101-03 (1994) (detailing the statutory definitions).
"The application that becomes a patent must disclose the invention with sufficient
definiteness such that someone of like ability - usually referred to as a person of "ordinary skill
in the art" - could replicate the invention by following the patent. See 35 U.S.C. 112 (1994). In
addition, the application must disclose the best way of practicing the invention known to the
inventor at the time the application is filed. 35 U.S.C. 112.
6See 35 U.S.C. 101 (1994) (stating that patentable subject matter includes any process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308-
09 (1980). In particular, it has been noted that the "subject-matter provisions of the patent law
have been cast in broad terms to fulfill the constitutional and statutory goal of promoting 'the
progress of science and the useful arts' with all that means for the social and economic benefits
envisioned by Jefferson." Id. at 315.
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value to the public by requiring that a patented invention be not only
new, but also not so obvious that it could be readily determined. 7
The U.S. Supreme Court has explained that the federal patent
system reflects a "carefully crafted bargain" - a social contract between
the inventor and society - that encourages innovation and promotes
increased knowledge in the public domain. 8 The grant of a patent is
both an incentive to create and a reward for disclosure of the invention
to the public. 9 The patentability requirements serve to ensure the
validity of the social contract by requiring the inventor to disclose
something of value to society in exchange for the right to exclude.
Disclosure benefits the public immediately because upon issuance of a
patent, which is a public document,2' the knowledge in the patent is
immediately available to the public and can be instrumental to
furthering innovation by others. Although use of the invention during
the term of the patent is not available without authorization from the
patent owner, the disclosed invention is immediately accessible upon
expiration of the limited patent term.
B. Patent Law, Policy and Genetic Material
1. Patentability
To most patients, as well as the public, the idea of patenting genes and
gene sequences seems counter-intuitive. One frequently voiced opinion
is that because genes are living material, they should not be patented.
However, the United States Patent Office (PTO) has long considered
isolated and purified genetic material to be patentable, based on the
premise that the isolated material does not exist naturally in that state
and therefore is not a mere discovery; isolated material is typically
created through recombinant DNA techniques to result in a more
"See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 156 (noting that "both the novelty and the
nonobviousness requirements of federal patent law are grounded in the notion that concepts
within the public grasp, or those so obvious that they readily could be, are the tools of creation
available to all"). Of course, there are those who contend that these technical requirements
either are ineffective, or not strong enough to truly weed out irrelevant inventions. See, e.g.,
James Gleick, Patently Absurd, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 12, 2000, at 44. But see Patenting
Business Methods: A White Paper of the AIPLA, AIPLA, Nov. 27, 2000, at http://www.aipla.
org/html/whitepaper2.htlm (advocating no change in the patent laws for business method
patents).
"See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 149.
"See, e.g., Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 480 (noting that patents provide both an incentive
to risk time, research and development, as well as a reward for disclosure of an invention).
'OSee id. at 480-81.
"See 35 U.S.C. 10-11, 13 (1994) (discussing the availability of patents to the public).
"See, e.g., David Resnik, DNA Patents and Human Dignity, 29 J.L. MED & ETHICS 152
(2001) (discussing objections to genetic patenting on human dignity grounds).
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"concentrated" product than that which could exist in nature.23
Although this issue remains controversial in some international
communities,24 it is essentially settled in the United States that isolated
genetic material is patentable subject matter.25  However, it should be
recalled that patentability requires both that there be patentable subject
matter and that the subject matter also satisfy the technical patentability
21
criteria.
The application of technical patentability criteria to genetic
inventions is still an evolving process. The Patent Act establishes that
all the technical criteria of patentability - utility, novelty and
nonobviousness - must be met for all inventions before a patent is
issued. However, the application of these criteria to genetic inventions
has not been static. For example, at one point isolated genes satisfied
the utility requirement, even if their only known utility was as a genetic
probe for further material.2 ' However, the PTO recently stated that
23See, e.g, Genentech v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (affirming a
patent for a DNA sequence); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (upholding a patent on the purified and isolated gene sequence which encodes human
erythropoietin); Lila Feisee & Brian Stanton, Are Biotechnology Patents Important, PTO
PULSE, Mar. 2000, at www.uspto.gov/go/opa/pulse/200003.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2002);
Biotechnology Industry Organization, Backgrounder on Patenting Gene-Based Inventions,
Genomics: Issues and Policies, Mar. 2000, at http//:www.bio.org/genomics/gene based.html
(noting that the PTO policy allowing the patentability of genes, expressed sequence tags, and
single nucleotide polymorphisms is "well established" and has already resulted in many issued
patents).24See, e.g., Cynthia M. Ho, International Intellectual Property Issues for Biotechnology,
in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLICY ISSUES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 761, 766-69
(Thomas J. Murray & Maxwell J. Mehlman, eds., 2000) (summarizing types of biotechnology
considered patentable subject matter in various countries); Donna M. Gitter, International
Conflicts Over Patenting Human DNA Sequences in the United States and the European
Union: An Argument for Compulsory Licensing and a Fair-Use Exemption, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1623, 1627-28 (2001) (noting the continuing controversy in Europe over the patenting of
human DNA sequences based on perceived lack of utility, as well as morality concerns). In
addition, even for countries that allow some genetic material to be patentable, the scope of
patentability may vary greatly, depending on the definitions of the technical requirements of
novelty, utility and nonobviousness. See, e.g., Carlos Correa, Patent Rights, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 198 (Carlos M. Correa &
Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, eds. 1998); J.H. Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global
Competition under the TRIPS Agreement, 29 INT'L L. & POL. 11, 29-32, 36-39 (1996-97)
(discussing the lack of universal standards of technical requirements of patentability, as well as
specific issues for biotechnology).
25See, e.g, supra note 23 (citing authority that accepts isolated genetic material as
patentable subject matter under United States laws); see also infra notes 27-30 and
accompanying text (discussing modifications to the technical requirements of patentability,
without questioning that subject matter is appropriate).
26See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text (explaining technical requirements of
patentability).27See, e.g., Patent and Trademark Office Utility Examination Guidelines, 60 Fed. Reg.
36263, 36264 (July 15, 1995) (noting that utility is established so long as the applicant makes
an assertion that would be credible to a person of ordinary skill in field); Arti Rai, Regulating
2004]
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genetic applications must now establish "substantial and credible
utility," - a standard intended to require that genetic patents must have
more utility than merely being a gene.28 In other words, a patentable
gene or gene sequence must have at least identified functionality or an
associated protein, in order to satisfy the utility requirement.
Regardless of the evolving application of technical patentability
criteria to genetic inventions, gene patents have issued and will likely
29
continue to issue in the foreseeable future. In particular, the propriety
of patenting genetic material is unlikely to be seriously challenged in
the United States anytime in the near future.3°  Accordingly, the
remainder of this article will assume that genetic inventions will
continue to be patentable and will address other issues attendant to the
issuance of these patents.
2. Inventorship versus Ownership
Inventorship and ownership are distinct, but often related, issues. The
inventor creates the patented invention whereas the patent owner holds
Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 Nw. U. L. REV.
77, 106-09 (1999) (describing liberalization of utility requirement).
2'See Patent and Trademark Office Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092,
1098 (Jan. 5, 2001) (detailing the utility requirement for patent examiners).
29See, e.g., Tebo, supra note 1, at 48 (noting recent statistics from the PTO indicating that
1000 patent applications involving human or animal DNA have been filed, in addition to 200
already issued patents); John Carey, The Genome Gold Rush, Bus. WK., June 12, 2000, at 147,
152 (illustrating that even junk DNA may be patentable); Pamela Sherrid, It's All About Cures
and Cash, 130 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 8, 2001, at 35 (noting that genomics companies
have been flooding the patent office with thousands of applications); Taking License With
Your Genes, supra note 1, at C1 (noting that there are over 7,000 pending patent applications
on genetic patents).
3
°This is especially true since the United States Supreme Court recently gave strong
affirmance to the principle of broad subject matter patentability in upholding the patentability
of plants despite overlapping protection provided under both the Plant Patent Act as well as the
Plant Variety Protection Act. See J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-bred Int'l, Inc, 122
S.Ct. 593, 596 (2001); see also Martin Bobrow & Sandy Thomas, Patents in a Genetic Age,
409 NATURE 763 (Feb. 15, 2001) (noting that thousands of patent claims to human DNA
sequences have been filed and granted and few have been subject to legal challenge thus far).
However, even United States patents on genetic material are not without controversy. See, e.g.,
Affordable Prescription Drugs and Medical Inventions Act, H.R. 1708, 107th Cong. (2001)
(proposing an amendment to the Patent Act to allow for compulsory licensing of certain
inventions relating to health); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Re-Examining the Role of Patents in
Appropriating the Value of DNA Sequences, 49 EMORY L. J. 783 (2000) (discussing whether
patentability is appropriate for DNA sequences); Cynthia M. Ho, Splicing Morality and Patent
Law.: Issues Aiising from Mixing Mice and Men, 2 J. L. & POL'Y 247 (2000) (discussing
resurgent argument against patenting of biological inventions that invoke overtones of morality,
as well as providing comparative perspective of European Patent System, which expressly
includes morality as a consideration in the evaluation of patentability). In addition, the tension
in this area is also evident from recently proposed, but un-enacted Congressional bills to limit
the enforceability of some such patents. See Genomic Science and Technology Act of 2002,
H.R. 3966, 107th Cong. (2002); Genomic Research and Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 2002,
H.R. 3967, 107th Cong. (2002).
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the rights inherent in a patent." It is possible that the inventor is also
the patent owner; in fact, the default rule in the United States is that a
patent is granted to the inventor. 2 However, because patents can be
conveyed like other types of property, the inventor may assign his
interest in the patent; in such a case, someone other than the inventor
would own the patent.33
From the perspective of patentability, inventorship is of primary
importance, while ownership is a mere housekeeping issue. As
discussed earlier, a patent can only be granted to inventions that are
shown to be new, useful, and nonobvious 4 To establish these
technical requirements, inventors must certify that they believe
themselves to be the first to have discovered the invention.35 The PTO
independently assesses whether the technical requirements of
patentability are met by comparing the patent application to the
inventions of others, commonly referred to as "prior art" comparison.36
Ownership issues are irrelevant to patentability, except to the
extent that joint ownership of inventions may help to avoid an
obviousness rejection. In addition, ownership of patent rights is
contingent upon the initial patentability inquiry succeeding in the first
3 See Beech Aircraft Corp. v. EDO Corp., 990 F.2d 1237, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("It is
elementary that inventorship and ownership are separate issues ... [I]nvertorship is a question of
who actually invented the subject matter claimed in a patent ... who ultimately possesses
ownership rights ... has no bearing whatsoever on the question of who actually invented that
subject matter.").
32See, e.g., Teets v. Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corp., 83 F.3d 403, 407 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(noting that an invention presumptively belongs to its creator).33The Patent Act actually explicitly clarifies that patents "shall have the attributes of
personal property." 35 U.S.C. 261 (1994).
3 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. In addition, the patent application must
sufficiently describe the invention such that a person of similar experience could replicate the
invention. See 35 U.S.C. 112 (1994). The application must also disclose the best method of
using the invention, as of the time of the application. 35 U.S.C. 112.35See 35 U.S.C. 102, 103, 111 (1994) (listing the patentability requirements and oath
requirement); see also 37 C.F.R. 1.63; U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PATENT AND TRADEMARK
OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE 602, 600-26-29 (7th ed. 1998; rev. 2000)
[hereinafter "MPEP"], available at http//:www.uspto.gov/web/office/pac/mpep/mpep. html.
Because the patent laws are intended to further the progress of science and also promote the
disclosure of inventions, the patent laws do have provisions that bar patentability to inventors
who unduly delay in requesting patents. See Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n,
54 F.3d 756 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting the dual purposes of rewarding the first patent inventor
and also prompt disclosure).36See MPEP, supra note 35, at 2100-8-15. This process includes not only what other
inventors have done, but may also include acts of the inventor himself in certain situations
where an inventor is considered to have not timely requested a patent after having discovered it.
See 35 U.S.C. 102(b), 102(g) (1994).
37See 35 U.S.C. 103 (1994); MPEP, supra note 35, at 700-1 to 700-177 (describing the
PTO prior art examination and providing no consideration of ownership, except with regard to
avoiding an obviousness rejection).
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instance. Although rights may be transferred with regard to a pending
patent application, the assignment of title is merely a procedural issue.38
II. THE PATIENT-PATENT INTERPLAY
A. The Patient Input
The specific factual scenarios that give rise to patentable subject matter
are important because they help to provide a context for patient
perspectives, as well as implications for patent law and policy.
Accordingly, before addressing the specific patent issues raised by
patient contributions, some typical situations in which patients provide
biological material that eventually leads to a patent will be outlined.
1. Sample Scenarios
a. 'Normal" Course of Treatment
Occasionally, a patient will have biological material removed from her
body during the normal course of medical treatment. This biological
material may subsequently be used for experimentation, although
Moore v. Regents of the University of California is the only published
case where the material eventually resulted in a patent.39 Thus far,
courts consider patients to have no property interest in materials
removed from their body attendant to the normal course of treatment.4°
Of even greater consequence in the context of patent issues, however, is
that other than in a case of extreme breach of fiduciary duty, patients
who have biological material removed during the routine course of
medical treatment are unlikely to be aware of the taking or subsequent
3 See supra note 33 and accompanying text (noting that patents may be assigned). There
are rules that permit a patent to issue to an inventor's assignee immediately upon patent grant.
See 35 U.S.C. 152 (1994) (noting that patents may be granted to the assignee of the inventor).
Pre-assignment of patent rights is often the norm. For example, employment agreements
typically pre-ordain that any patents created on the premises shall be assigned to the
corporation; inventions that resulted from research done in the course of work for a corporate
entity are usually assigned to the corporation. See, e.g., Lucy Gamon, Note, Patent Law in the
Context of Corporate Research, 8 J. CoRp. L. 497, 498 (1983). In addition, assignment of
inventions created in an academic context are also common. See, e.g., Chou v. Univ. of Chi.,
254 F.3d 1347, 1356-57 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (affirming a district court holding that a university
scientist could assign all her patent rights to her university employer even without an actual
contract because her acceptance of her academic post was subject to the faculty handbook
which included a provision for assignment of inventions). See generally Steven Cherensky, A
Penny For Their Thoughts: Employee-Inventors, Preinvention Assignment Agreements,
Property, and Personhood, 81 CAL. L. REV. 595,602-04 (1993).39See e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 480 (Cal. 1990).
4 See e.g., id.
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profits arising from their contribution.4 ' Accordingly, such patients are
unlikely to be even aware of any resulting patent profits.
b. Doctors Who Seek out "Special"Populations
As early as the 1970s, scientists have been seeking out isolated
populations with unique gene pools because of the increased chance of
scientific success. In particular, studies of isolated populations with
common genes can ease the scientific path to discovery of genetic
disorders by limiting the number of variables with which scientists
42
must contend. Scientists can more easily find genetic markers by
comparing genetic profiles of all individuals in an isolated population
who suffer from a genetic disorder, compared with those who do not.
In addition, isolated populations often more easily yield extensive
genealogies and other health information that may further assist
scientific research. For example, the discovery of the breast cancer
gene, BRCA-1, was achieved after a decade of sampling and testing
Mormon families in Utah who had genetic commonality, as well as
extensive genealogy information available to researchers. 3
c. Special Patients Who Seek Researchers
In addition to scientists who seek out special populations, patients may
present themselves for research. This is particularly true for patients
suffering from presently incurable diseases; in such cases, there is a
high incentive for patients to volunteer blood and other biological
material with the hope that scientists will more readily identify a
genetic marker that can result in specific treatment.
In addition, some people have presented themselves or others to
doctors for research purposes when there is no clear disease, but there
are anomalous symptoms. For example, one man presented himself for
research when he realized that he had been repeatedly exposed to the
4 However, in one particularly egregious case of breach of fiduciary duty, patient John
Moore's doctor not only took out a diseased organ, but required the patient to make repeated
return trips to provide additional biological material including blood and semen samples that
were not actually medically necessary. Id. at 481-82.4 2See, e.g., LORI ANDREWS & DOROTHY NELKIN, BODY BAZAAR: THE MARKET FOR
HUMAN TISSUE IN THE BIOTECHNOLOGY AGE 43-44 (2001).43See, e.g., id. Another isolated group that has been utilized for genetic testing is the
Amish in Pennsylvania. Id. at 42-43; see also Robin Marantz Henig, Tricky Truths About
Ethnicity and Genetics, WASH. POST, Oct 5, 1997, at CI (noting the efficiencies of screening a
selected population with similar genes, such as Ashkenazi Jews). Similarly, some companies
have sought and obtained even larger populations of relatively pure samples in Iceland and
Canada. See, e.g., Henry T. Greely, Iceland's Plan for Genomics Research: Facts and
Implications, JURIMETRICS 153 (2000); see also Michael J. Smith, Comment, Population-Based
Genetic Studies: Informed Consent and Confidentiality, 18 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 57, 68-72 (2001) (discussing similar projects in Estonia, as well as proposed studies
in the United Kingdom, Italy, Tonga, and even the U.S. in limited instances).
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AIDS virus, but never contracted the virus himself. Similarly, one
woman presented her cat for study when it showed signs typical of
immunodeficiency, but failed to test for feline leukemia, which was the
only known immunodeficiency disorder in cats at the time."
In addition, patients sometimes present not only themselves, but
may also locate similarly afflicted people and present the combined
biological material for researchers to study. For example, Nancy
Wexler, a psychologist who had a substantial genetic risk of
Huntington's disease, spearheaded the discovery and collection of
blood samples from a concentrated population of family members in
Venezuela.46 Similar situations have resulted in the location of genes
41that cause cystic fibrosis and predispose patients to breast cancer.
More recently, the parents of a child born with Canavan disease, a
genetic disorder that leads to brain degeneration, recruited a researcher,
organized a nationwide collection of biomaterial, and also financed the
research itself.8  Similarly, the patient-based group PXE International
established a bank of biological material relating to the genetic disorder
• 41
PXE, to assist research regarding this disorder.
"Morley Safer, 60 Minutes: Whose Body Is It Anyway? Companies Patenting Genetic
Makeups (CBS television broadcast, Feb. 25, 2001) (noting that Steve Crohn offered himself
up to the Aaron Diamond AIDS Research Center in New York for study when he was puzzled
as to why he consistently tested negative for HIV despite regular exposure and became
convinced that he was carrying some kind of immunity).
"
5See infra notes 134-57 and accompanying text (describing the case of Marlo Brown and
the negative legal reception she received for her claims before two different courts).
4'This enabled researchers to compare the genetic material of those afflicted with
Huntington's versus their unafflicted relatives to accelerate the research process. See ALICE
WEXLER, MAPPING FATE: A MEMOIR OF FAMILY, RISK AND GENETIC RESEARCH (1996); see also
ANDREWS & NELKIN, supra note 42 at 50; Thomas H. Maugh II, Unraveling the Secrets of
Genes: Genetic Experiments Have Exploded and Could Hold the Key to Making Such Diseases
as Cystic Fibrosis, Huntington's and Lou Gehng's Obsolete, but Ethical Questions Remain,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1993, at Al (describing the analysis performed on the genetic material of
cystic fibrosis, Huntington's and Lou Gehrig's disease patients); Gerardo Jimenez-Sanchez,
Human Disease Genes, 409 NATURE 853, 853-55 (Feb. 15, 2001) (focusing on the protein
produced by specific genes and choosing functional designations that were largely informed by
the features of pathology).4
1See supra note 43 and accompanying text (concerning the discovery of BRCA-l, the
breast cancer gene).41See Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 208 F. Supp. 2d 918,
921 (N.D. 111. 2002). Over the course of seven years, the Greenbergs provided tissue and blood
samples of their family, including a tissue sample of their son's organs, after his death from
Canavan disease. Idat 921.41See, e.g., Paul Smaglik, Tissue Donors Use Their Influence in Deal Over Gene Patent
Terms, 407 NATURE 821 (Oct. 19, 2000); Matt Fleischer, Seeking Rights to Crucial Gene,
NATIONAL L. J., June 25, 2001, at Cl; Andy Coghlan, People With Inherited Diseases are
Ready to Challenge Pro-Lifers Over the Future of Medical Research, New Scientist, Feb. 2,
2001, at 4 (quoting the chairman of PXE International as noting that patent ownership was
desirable to "accelerate the research process, control royalty and license fees, and eliminate turf
wars between researchers"). PXE is a relatively rare genetic disorder that causes connective
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2. Informed Consent
Each of the situations that give rise to patient contributions has
important implications for informed consent. In particular, the doctrine
of informed consent requires that doctors, as well as researchers,
explain their care or research prior to operating on patients, removing
material from them, or subjecting them to testing."' In the case of
patient contributions, although a procedure for obtaining informed
consent is typically used, patients have a perception that their consent
was not truly informed, as will be discussed in the next section.
To provide a foundation for evaluating patient perceptions, it is
important to first understand the basic requirements of informed
consent, as well as how it is usually obtained. On a practical level, the
doctrine of informed consent has evolved into a disclosure form that
states the procedure to be done and its associated risks. Patients are
asked to sign the form to indicate their assent to the procedure after
being apprised of the risks." Some of these forms also request the
patient's consent to allow information obtained through the procedure
to be used for research purposes, without identification of the
individual patient. However, these forms typically do not indicate that
this research may culminate in a patent application, let alone the fact
that a patent would legally allow limited access to a patented medical
treatment. 2
Moreover, even if a researcher did attempt to include potential
patents in the official consent form and a patient understood the
implications, it is still unclear whether this would impact the net
tissue to harden. Id. There was no known treatment for this disease when the patient group PXE
International was formed. Id.
5
°See Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (1990); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OFTORTS, 829B cmt. 1(1979).
5The form may include other information that the patient is asked to consent to,
including, for example, agreement to release confidential information to insurers to secure
reimbursement.
"The failure of the informed consent form to specifically indicate that patent rights may
be sought has been raised in at least one lawsuit. Greenberg, 208 F. Supp.2d at 921-22
(asserting that the patients were not informed of any intent to seek a patent on the research for
which patients were assisting and alleging several causes of action, including lack of informed
consent, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, and conversion). In addition, most
patients contend that the scientists they worked with never even mentioned that their research
might result in a patent application. Id. at 921 (noting the contrary expectation of patients that
their contributions would be used to develop medical procedures that would remain within the
public domain); Moore, 793 P.2d at 485 (describing the fiduciary duty a doctor owes a patient);
see also ANDREWS & NELKIN, supra note 40, at 56 (listing the conflicts researchers have as a
factor for this problem); Fleischer, supra note 49, at A14 (describing how parents of blood
donors did not know how their children's blood would be used); Justin Gillis, Gene Research
Success Spurs Profit Debate, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2000, at Al (describing the donors as
feeling exploited).
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outcome.53 In particular, because many patients who donate biological
material are at a loss for other options because of the lack of existing
treatments, it is unclear whether they could properly evaluate the pros
and cons of consenting to patents derived from their donations. 4 Any
remote monetary consequences that may arise from their participation
may be irrelevant to patients who have no treatment alternatives. In
addition, patients without other avenues for, treatment may fail to
appreciate that they could decline to waive intellectual property rights
based upon their contributions, let alone attempt to bargain for different
outcomes.55
3. Patient Perceptions
The patient perspective is a key component to addressing the problems
raised by patents based upon their contributions. As already noted, the
largest gap exists between patient perception and current reality with
respect to the fact that a patent may result from their contributions. A
corollary gap in understanding is the fact that patents provide their
owners with the right to exclude others, including the potential to
charge higher prices 6  Many patients improperly assume that all
research and results based upon their contributions will be made freely
available to help other similarly situated patients.5  Accordingly,
patients are typically shocked when they discover that their aid has
actually resulted in limited access to tests and treatments because their
53For example, an informed consent form could more explicitly require patients to waive
rights to future claims or interests in resulting intellectual property. However, because most
patients have, at best, a rudimentary understanding of patents, a consent form that adequately
explains the results of a patent may be difficult for patients to comprehend. See infra notes 63-
66 and accompanying text (explaining patient misperceptions concerning patents).
5See, e.g., Danforth, supra note 9, at 198.
"See infra notes 194-96 and accompanying text (discussing the "option" that patients
have in contracting for different outcomes).
56See 35 U.S.C. 271(a) (1994) (providing that the patent owner has the right to exclude
all others from making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing the patented invention);
Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964) (noting that "[a] patent empowers the owner to
exact royalties as high as he can negotiate with the leverage of that monopoly."); W. L. Gore &
Associates, Inc. v. Carlisle Corp., 381 F.Supp. 680, 701 (D. Del. 1974) (noting that the patent
right is about charging "what the market will bear").
"See, e.g., Greenberg, 208 F. Supp.2d at 921 (noting patients' expectations that any
resulting tests would benefit the "population at large" and that patients were surprised to find
that organizations with free testing programs were threatened with litigation); Fleischer, Patent
Thyself AM. LAWYER, at 84, 87 (June 2001) (noting that a number of families who donated
blood in the hopes of discovering a test for Canavan's disease had done so under the assumption
that the test would be available to all); Gillis, supra note 52, at Al (quoting one contributing
patient who was reacting in shock to the discovery of a patent based on his contribution, "all of
us felt that was a real slap in the face ... It was a common understanding that we were all doing
this to benefit the common good.").
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assistance resulted in a patent." There are two central components to
the patients' experience of shock and dismay: (1) an often false
presumption about the neutrality of doctors and researchers with whom
they deal; and (2) a lack of comprehension about patents.
a. Assumed Neutrality of Doctors and Researchers
Patient contributors typically assume that the scientists and doctors
with whom they interact are involved solely in the pursuit of
knowledge and are therefore immune to commercial interests. 9 This
assumption may stem, at least in part, from the patients' own voluntary
and philanthropic acts.6° In addition, patients may be unaware that
doctors and researchers may have commercial interests that ordinarily
would not be disclosed during the course of medical care or research.6
Moreover, even if a researcher does not personally have a commercial
interest, the fact that many researchers work for commercial entities
will result in commercialization of their research. For example, in the
Canavan case, the researcher was required to seek a patent by his
employer, and in fact had assigned his interests in any potential patents
to his employer prior to the patient contributions. 2
8In one recent case, patients who provided biomaterial had no idea that the research they
sponsored would result in a patent; they only discovered the patent when the patent owner,
Miami Children's Hospital, began to limit testing by academic laboratories. See, e.g.,
Greenberg, 208 F. Supp.2d at 921;Gillis, supra note 52, at Al.
59Vicki Brower, Canavan Families Slam Scientists over Test Patent Profits, BIOTECH.
NEWSWATCH, Dec. 4, 2000, at 1 (noting that they did not realize that the tissue they donated
would be used for profit, or to restrict use of any resulting tests to other families); see also Gina
Kolata, Sharing of Profits is Debated as the Value of Tissue Rises, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2000,
at A17 (quoting Michigan law professor Rebecca Eisenberg as noting that "people may
contribute their tissue in the expectation that nobody is going to make a profit on it, but that's a
little naive. There's no free lunch here.") Id.
6°See, e.g., Brower, supra note 59, at 1 (noting that the family of children who died of
Canavan's disease donated the brain tissue of their children to a researcher for testing).
6 See, e.g., Alice Dembner, Research Integrity Declines, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 22, 2000,
at E2 (describing commercialization of scientific research in the area of medical care); Penni
Crabtree, From Prof to Profit; Money and Scientists Mingle, Creating Companies and
Concerns, S. D. UNION-TRIBUNE, Oct. 29, 2000, at H-1 (describing conflicts of interest.); see
also Pilar N. Ossorio, ills, Bills & Shills: Physician-Researcher's Conflicts of Interest, 8 WID.
L. SYMp. J. 75, 77 (2001) (describing conflicts of interest for doctors who are also researchers);
Janet Fleetwood, Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Research, 8 WID. L. SYMP. J. 105, 106-09
(2001) (listing factors that hamper full disclosure of patient understanding of consent forms);
Jennifer Washburn, Informed Consent, WASH. POST MAG., Dec. 30, 2001, at W16 (describing
the conflict of interest of doctor-researchers with a focus on conflict of interests involved in
soliciting patients to join clinical studies).62See, e.g., Kolata, supra note 59, at A17 (noting that researcher Dr. Reubon Matalon's
employment contract required that every invention he made would be owned by his employer);
Gillis, supra note 52, at Al (noting that researcher and doctor Reuben Matalon was obliged to
tell the hospital that he worked for about the patentable discovery, which then was applied for
and granted to Miami University Children's Hospital).
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b. Patent System Misperception
Most patients do not comprehend the basis upon which patents are
granted. In particular, while patients may be correct that it was their
"idea" that a genetic problem existed, patents are not granted for ideas
or observations alone.63 In most cases where patients have contributed
biological material to scientists, the scope of the actual patent is quite
different from the mere concept that the patient's genes were an
anomaly.64 In particular, scientists usually must perform additional
testing to determine the genetic marker that controls for the anomaly
and it is the discovery of the marker, rather than the patient's
65identification of an aberration, that is granted a patent.
In addition, patients perceive the exclusivity inherent in patent
rights to be fundamentally inequitable. Patient contributors are often
affronted by the current scheme that enables patent owners to charge
heightened prices to everyone including those who contributed to the
discovery of the invention.66 Accordingly, some patient contributors
are interested in patent ownership as a way of controlling access to
patented inventions, or at least control of licensing of the invention.67
In particular, when patients realize that someone else is reaping profits
based upon their contributions, the patients may feel that the obvious
equitable solution would be that they must be entitled to a part of the
thing, which creates profits, i.e. the patent. This is particularly true for
patients who claim that scientists could not have created the patentable
invention without their assistance. 8
B. Research Reality
1. Commercial Interests
This section will clarify that the general perception among patients that
doctors and scientists are principally devoid of commercialism does not
accurately reflect the current situation. There is a growing body of
literature regarding the increasing commercialization of science,
particularly bio-medical sciences.69 For example, academic scientists in
63Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kaola Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130-32 (1948). See
generally35 U.S.C. 101 (1994).
"See infra note 100-76 and accompanying text (explaining why patient contributions,
including John Moore's, fail to rise to the level of inventorship).65 See id.
'See, e.g., Greenberg, 208 F. Supp.2d at 921 (alleging that defendants earned significant
royalties from the resulting patent, as well as the fact that the researcher they worked with has
personally profited).
67See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text (discussing PXE situation).68See, e.g., Safer, supra note 44 (quoting patient contributor Fuchs as stating that
"without my blood ... they would not have had this discovery" and that it was his idea that his
immune system was unique, such that he should share in the patent profits).69Kathleen Cranley Glass & Trudo Lemmens, Conflict of Interest and Commercialization
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these areas often also have financial ties to pharmaceutical and
genomic industries. Moreover, regardless of any industrial ties, many
universities currently view patents, particularly their potential licensing
revenue, as one way to supplement an ever-decreasing pool of federal
funding for research.71
Some of this commercialization, and particularly an increased
focus on patents in the bio-medical area, is often attributed to the U.S.
Supreme Court's 1980 holding in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, that
genetically engineered bacteria could constitute patentable subject
matter; this decision has been seen as opening the flood-gates to patents
on living matter and fostering the then nascent biotechnology field.
72
Subsequent to this important case, major federal legislation also
encouraged commercialization of research. For example, changed
federal rules enabled industry to patent and accordingly reap
commercial rewards from research that was initially based upon
publicly funded projects.73 In addition, federal legislation specifically
of Biomedical Research Office, in THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF GENETIC RESEARCH: ETHICAL,
LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES (Caufield & Williams-Jones, eds. 1999; OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, BIOTECHNOLOGY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 45-69 (1991)) (describing the financing
of biotechnology); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 411-
30 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1991) (discussing relationships between university and
industry); Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d at 506-23 (Mosk, dissenting).
7 0See, e.g., Krimsky, supra note 1, at 15-20 (giving the historical development of how
scientists interact with industry, focusing on molecular genetics); Zach W. Hall & Christopher
Scott, University-Industry Partnership, 291 SCIENCE 553 (2001) (editorializing about the
relationship between universities and private industry in the biomedical research community);
Kolata, supra note 59, at A17 (quoting Professor Hank Greely of Stanford Law school as
stating that "these days, there is very little academic research that doesn't have some
commercial interest, and almost always now the researcher has a potential commercial
interest"); Ronald Kotulak, Playing Doctor ... or Playing God? Patents are University's Gold
Mine, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 9, 2001, at CI (discussing the University of Wisconsin's use of patents
to earn $ 1.65 billion in licensing and investment revenues since 1927).
7 See e.g., Karen W. Arenson, Columbia Sets Pace in Profiting Off Research, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 2, 2000, at B 1 (noting Columbia as a particularly aggressive academic institution
in deriving profits from patents); Hall & Scott, supra note 70, at 553. See also Jeff Gottlieb,
UCI Case Raises Issue of Schools' Ties to Business, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1998, at Al (noting
that UC-Irvine is more dependent than some other institutions on private funds because it only
obtains about half of its research funding from the federal government).
72See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 308, 318 (1980) (holding that the Patent Act
fairly embraces organisms produced by genetic engineering. See also Krimsky, supra note 1, at
23-25 (describing how Chakabarty allows some biological material to be patented); John M.
Golden, Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and Patentability: Natural Products and Inventions
in the American Patent System, 50 EMORY L. J. 101, 105 (2001) (noting that Chakrabarty, in
combination with the newly created Federal Circuit, helped to foster the development of pro-
biotechnology jurisprudence); Kenneth Sutherlin Dueker, Biobusiness on Campus.
Commercialization of University-Developed Biomedical Technologies, 52 FOOD DRUG L.J.
453, 494 (1997) (discussing Chakrabarty decision and the subsequent growth of biotechnology
after Genentech's initial public offering).
73Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. 200-11 (1994); Steven-Wydler Act, 15 U.S.C. 3701-14
(1994); see also GARY W. MATKIN, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND THE UNIVERSITY 81-94 (1990)
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promoting collaboration among government and industry was also
enacted.74
2. Patent Impact: Restricted Access
One side effect of the commercialization of biotechnology has been the
increased active enforcement of patents. In particular, both
corporations as well as universities have been more aggressive in
pursuing licensing agreements or suing those who refuse to agree to
license terms.75 Patient advocates assert that licensing fees for the use
of patented diagnostic tests have been priced exorbitantly high, such
that clinics either refuse to offer the test or only offer the test at prices
that far exceed what most consumers can pay.76 This is particularly true
because the demand of licensing fees is often a precursor or a
concomitant threat of litigation for unauthorized use of a patent.
77
Although restricted access and increased costs are a direct result of
the patents, this result is actually contemplated and encouraged by
some underlying patent policy principles. Fundamentally, a patent
provides its owner with the legal right to exclude all others who make,
use, or sell the patented invention.7 ' This fact is supported by theories
of patent law that permit the exclusivity of patents as an incentive to
create, as well as a means to recoup development costs. 79 In addition,
(describing how four specific academic institutions have utilized patents). However, whether
firms will be able to continue to patent the results of research that is partially funded by the
government is uncertain in light of recent public opposition. See, e.g., Peter Arno & Michael
Davis, Paying Twice for the Same Drug, WASH. POST, at A21 (Mar. 27, 2002) (editorial
criticizing the government for failing to properly supervise the federal financing of patented
drugs).74the Technology Transfer Act allows government researchers to patent their inventions
and also obtain patent-based royalties (up to $ 150,000). 15 U.S.C. 3710(c)(a)(3) (1994). In
addition, the act allows and encourages government researchers to enter into commercial
arrangements with for-profit companies. Id. at 3701-14 (1994) (providing for CRADA).
75See, e.g., MATKIN, supra note 73, passim (describing the creation of technology transfer
offices at universities after patents became more common); Dueker, supra note 72, at 464-67
(noting the increased patent licensing activity among universities after the enactment of the
Bayh-Dole Act); Kotulak, supra note 70, at Cl (noting the University of Wisconsin's effective
patent licensing program).76 See, e.g., Tebo, supra note 1, at 50-51 (citing Jeremy Rifkin, who noted that genetic
tests based on non-patented genes cost around $ 50 while tests based on patented genes can cost
$ 2500 after licensing fees are considered).
77See Greenberg, 208 F.Supp. 2d at 921 (noting that patent owner sent "enforcement
letters" to centers offering the patented test for free and also sought to limit the total number of
labs using the patented disease through exclusive licensing agreements; Tebo, supra note 1, at
50-51 (comparing current gene patent enforcement to historical surgical procedure patent
enforcement).
7See 35 U.S.C. 271 (1994) (providing that patent owners have the right to exclude all
others from making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing the patented invention).
"See supra notes 10-21 and accompanying text (describing patent law theory that
supports the patent owner right to exclusivity).
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because the time invested in creating a patentable invention, as well as
the time and money spent procuring a patent is substantial, those that
undergo this process have a financial incentive to ensure that others are
not usurping their exclusive right to use the patented invention.
However, although patent laws may contemplate the fact that
patents result in restricted access, there are also health policy arguments
for tempering the usual patent laws when they negatively impact public
health." In addition, in the case of patents that are based upon patient
contributions, such restricted access ironically excludes those who
helped secure the patent.81  Moreover, patents based upon patient
contributions have a potential negative feedback cycle that threatens
further research and collaboration." In particular, patients who believe
8 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. 271(e)(1) (1994) (providing limited exception to infringement to
enable acceleration of FDA approval of generic medications); Canada - Patent Protection of
Pharmaceutical Products (Generic Medicines), Report of the Panel, WT/DS 114/R (March 17,
2000), available at http://www.wto.org/english (considering public health impacts in evaluating
patent rights in an international dispute before an arbitration panel of the World Trade
Organization). The increasing number of patents and patent players has been criticized as
impeding the progress of science in many areas. See also Rebecca Eisenberg, Technology
Transfer and The Genome Project: Problems with Patenting Research Tools, 5 RISK HEALTH
SAFETY & ENV'T. 163 (1994) (describing limitations to licensing of all patent rights essential to
continue research); Clarisa Long, Proprietary Rights and Why Initial Allocations Matter, 49
EMORY L. J. 823, 827-36 (2000) (describing problems inherent in patent licensing of basic
research, especially transaction costs); see also HUGO Statement on Patenting of DNA
Sequences (April 2000), at http://www.gene.ucl.ac.uk/hugo/patent2000.html (clarifying
opposition to patenting of genetic components where there is a negative impact on the further
progress of research); Arti K. Rai, The Information Revolution Reaches Pharmaceuticals:
Balancing Incentives, Costs, and Access in the Post-Genomics Era, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 173,
192-94 (2001) (describing the potential problem of patents on early-stage genomics research for
later commercialization); Taking License With Your Genes, supra note 1, at Cl (discussing the
impact of the increasing gene patents on medical research and health care costs).
"For example, the hospital that owned the patent rights related to the gene for Canavan's
disease threatened to sue clinics who provided the test for free and demanded a royalty
payment that would essentially prevent the clinics from continuing to provide a service to
patients. See, e.g., Greenberg, 208 F. Supp.2d at 921; Brower, supra note 59, at I (noting that
the Canavan Foundation was blocked from offering free genetic screening after refusing to pay
royalties and follow licensing restrictions by patent owner Miami Children's Hospital which
requested that the tests be limited in number, as well as in location); Gillis, supra note 52, at
A14 (describing different licensing approaches taken by patent owner Miami Children's
Hospital including a failed attempt to exclusively license the patent); Taking License With
Your Genes, supra note 1, at Cl (noting some doctors have stopped offering a test for Down
Syndrome because the patent licensing fees, together with low Medicare payments, do not
make it a viable commercial option); James Meek, Doctors Hindered by Company's Gene
Patent, THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 7, 2002, at 8 (noting that doctors' ability to study
haemochromatosis, a disease affecting up to 20,000 Britons, is hindered because the patent
owner on the underlying gene has enforced the patent against laboratories resulting in a
reduction of testing by about one third).
"Many patients provide contributions on the assumption that resulting research will be
freely available to all; if patients realize the commercial realities, they may refuse to participate.
See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text (noting that patients were shocked to discover
the results of their contributions patented because they had assumed all treatments would be
freely available).
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that they will merely be used as means to get a patent may refuse to
contribute their biological materials, or may require licensing of their
biological materials, which would further increase the overall costs of
obtaining a patent.83
In addition, although patients and patent owners could
theoretically "strike a bargain," that has been unlikely because of how
research is currently conducted.84  In particular, researchers often are
obligated to assign any inventions that they discover during the course
of their work to their employer.85 Accordingly, many of the scientists
who work with patient contributors have little control over whether a
patent is sought and often have already ceded any ownership interest in
patents to their employers. Moreover, the organization that owns a
patent typically views a patent as an income-generating device, rather
than something that would create deep-seated resentments or have
negative impact on further research. In fact, in the typical situation
where a researcher works with patient contributors but is required to
give the corporate employer patent ownership, the patent owner would
have no direct interaction with the impacted patient population.
Although patient perceptions are not reflected in the current
medico-research reality, a reasoned inquiry into whether patients are
overlooked as potential inventors under patent laws is an important
question. If patients could be considered patent inventors, or otherwise
gain some control over the patent, some of their negative perceptions
would be allayed, if not alleviated.
III. ADDRESSING THE INVENTORSHIP ISSUE
A. The Importance of Inventorship
1. In ventorship Policy
The significance of inventorship in patent law is underscored
repeatedly in the United States Patent Act. From the first application
for a patent, correct identification of the inventor is underscored. Not
only must the original inventor(s) request a patent application,86 but
"See Fleischer, Seeking Rights to Crucial Gene, supra note 49, at C16 (citing Professor
Eisenberg for criticizing the PXE approach as potentially hindering research efforts because of
the increasing number of individuals seeking rights).
8'However, this possibility is nonetheless discussed as a possible option. See infra notes
194-96 and accompanying text (discussing the contractual approach taken by patient group
PXE). 85See supra note 38 (noting that inventions may be assigned prior to patent grant); see
also supra note 62 and accompanying text (noting that the researcher who worked with patient
contributors in the Canavan case had in fact been required to assign his rights as part of his
employment contract).
8635 U.S.C. 111 (1994) (noting that application shall be made, or authorized to be made
by an inventor and include an oath by the inventor).
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also the inventor(s) must submit oaths declaring their belief that they
are the first and true inventors." These procedural rules help ascertain
whether the patentability requirement that the invention is indeed new,
rather than derived from another, is satisfied." In addition, the
importance of these rules is underscored by the fact that improper
naming of inventors can result in invalidation of the patent, i.e., total
loss of all patent rights.89
Inventorship is also emphasized by certain unique aspects of
United States patent law that have repeatedly withstood pressure to
comply with a different international norm. The United States is the
only industrialized country to continue to insist that patents be granted
only to those who are first inventors ("first to invent" rule), as opposed
to a rule that rewards those who are first to request a patent ("first to
file" rule).9°  The United States' distinct position has been fairly
consistent throughout the history of the Patent Act.9 Congress has
rejected proposals to adopt a first to file system thus far and interested
organizations, including independent inventors, have strongly
denounced such proposals as inimical to U.S. patent policy.92  The
8735 U.S.C. 115 (oath requirement for inventor).
8See 35 U.S.C. 102(f).
'
9See, e.g., id, see also Jamesbury Corp. v. United States, 518 F.2d 1384, 1395 (1975)
(noting that inclusion of less than all the inventors can make a patent void, if established by
clear and convincing evidence); PerSeptive Biosystems, Inc. v. Pharmacia Biotech, 12 F.
Supp.2d. 69 (D.Mass. 1998) (holding patent unenforceable on grounds of inequitable conduct
because of failure to name inventors). However, there are procedures that would typically be
applicable to correction of inventorship, including either the issuance of a certificate of
correction or the re-issuance of a patent, depending on a number of other factors. These factors
include whether the inventors agreed to the change as well as whether there were other errors in
the patent. See 35 U.S.C. 251 (1994); 35 U.S.C. 255 (listing the requirement for certificate of
correction); 35 U.S.C. 256(listing the requirement for correction of the named inventor); see
also Merry Mfg. Co. v. Bums Tool Co., 335 F.2d 239, 242 (5th Cir. 1964).
9°Request for Comments on the International Effort to Harmonize the Substantive
Requirements of Patent Laws, 66 Fed. Reg. 15409, 15410 (Mar. 19, 2001) (noting current U.S.
adherence to the first-to-invent rule in contrast to the remainder of the world); 21st Century
Patent System Improvement Act, Congressional Record - House of Representatives, 105th
Cong., 1st Sess., April 23, 1997, 143 Cong. Rec. H1719-03, at H1727 (clarifying that the
United states is a first to invent, rather than first to file nation); Steal American Technologies
Act, 142 CONG. REC. H6718-02 (daily ed. June 25, 1996) (statement of Rep. Rohrabacher)
(noting that the U.S. is the only country in the world operating under the first-to-invent system).
9Beginning with the 1790 Patent Act, the first incarnation of the current Patent Act,
there was consideration and rejection of a first-to-file system in favor of the current system of
rewarding the first true inventor. See, e.g., Edward C. Waltersheid, Priority of Invention: How
the United States Came to Have a "First-to-Invent" Patent System, 23 AIPLA Q.J. 263, 286-88
(1995).
92See, e.g., Edwin A. Suominen, Re-Discovering Article 1, Section 8 - The Formula for
First-to-Invent, J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 641 (2001); Edward G. Fiorito, The "Basic Proposal" for
Harmonization of US and Worldwide Patent Laws Submitted by WIPO, 73 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y
83 (1991). However, the United States may eventually succumb to international pressures in the
interest of securing an efficient global system of patent filing. See, e.g., Tod Preston, The
World Intellectual Property Organization's Conference on the International Patent System, 3
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United States' resistance to abandoning the first to invent policy is
further underscored by the fact that the current system actually results
in a far more complex process of determining who is entitled to a
patent.
93
Although United States patent policy favors the first to invent, the
nomenclature "first to invent" is somewhat of a misnomer since the
system is not one of absolute priority. Rather, priority is tempered by
another important social policy underlying the patent system; namely,
the idea that patents are to be rewarded to those who first share their
inventions with the public such that the greater public knowledge is
benefited. For example, if an individual is the absolute first to conceive
the invention, but keeps it secret from the public for one hundred years,
a later inventor who quickly divulges the invention will nonetheless be
awarded a patent because that second inventor was the first to bring an
invention to society's knowledge.94 Similarly, even if a first inventor
does not keep an invention secret, but unduly delays between
conceiving the invention and reducing it to practice while a second
inventor is the first to reduce the invention to practice, the first inventor
can lose the right to the patent because of the strong policy favoring
prompt disclosure of inventions to society.9 Accordingly, the patent
rules mediate between the policy of providing the patent to the first
inventor while also encouraging prompt disclosure of inventions. 96
2. The Implications of Inventorship on Patent Ownership
USPTO TODAY, at 3, 5 (Mar./Apr. 2002), at http://www.uspto.gov/go/opa/ptotoday/ mar-
apr2002.pdf (noting recent consideration of first to file issue); Waltersheid, supra note 91, at
264.
93See 35 U.S.C. 102(g) (1994). The complex adjudicatory system for determining the
first inventor is officially called a patent interference in which the PTO determines which of
two entities was the true first inventor. See 35 U.S.C. 135 (providing for interference
procedure); MPEP, supra note 35, at 2300-1 to 2300-36 (providing information on interferences
for patent examiners).
9435 U.S.C. 102 (g) (1994); see also Correge v. Murphy, 705 F.2d 1326, 1330 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (quoting International Glass v. United States, 408 F.2d 395, 403 (Ct. Cl. 1968) (noting
that "the courts have consistently held that an invention though completed, is deemed
abandoned, suppressed, or concealed if, within a reasonable time after completion, no steps are
taken to make the invention publicly known. Thus, failure to file a patent application; to
describe the invention in a publicly disseminated document; or to use the invention publicly,
have been held to constitute abandonment, suppression, or concealment.")); see also 35 U.S.C.
102(b) (1994) (barring patentability of invention if inventor unduly delays between publicizing
the invention and filing for a patent); LaPorte, Inc. v. Norfolk Dredging Co., 787 F.2d 1577
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (noting that one of the purposes of 102(b) is to encourage early filing).
95See, e.g., W.L. Gore & Assoc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983);
see also 35 U.S.C. 102(g) (1994).
96See Checkpoint Sys., 54 F.3d at 761 (noting that one of the purposes of 102(g) is to
ensure that the patent goes to the first inventor while another purpose is to encourage prompt
disclosure of the invention).
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The importance of inventorship also extends into patent ownership. In
particular, patent laws reward inventors with presumptive ownership of
patents on their inventions. The ownership presumption is crucial
because patent ownership conveys the right to exclude all others from
any use of the patented invention without the owner's consent;
accordingly, ownership of a widely utilized invention can be of huge
financial importance. 7
Patent ownership rules also favor inventors who jointly create an
invention by providing each joint inventor with the same presumptive
right to patent ownership. The Patent Act explicitly provides that
patents have attributes of personal property and that each joint inventor
can license the patented invention without consent or even accounting
to other co-owners.98 Accordingly, being the inventor or even a joint
inventor of a patent conveys extensive privileges.
Inventorship is a key issue for patient contributors who seek to
control the results of their contributions. For example, if patient
contributors were considered inventors or even joint inventors of
patents under current rules, they could license any entities they wished,
even over the objections of other joint inventors. In addition, courts
have held that in the case of joint inventors, a complete defense to one
joint inventor's infringement claim is a license by the other joint
inventor.99 Accordingly, if patients were joint inventors, they could
potentially trump the desires of the other joint inventor to sue for patent
infringement or to charge exorbitant license fees. For example, in the
Canavan case, if the contributing patients were considered joint
inventors, they could have provided royalty-free licenses to the labs
that wished to provide the patented test and thereby insulate these labs
from the prospect of infringement suits from the other joint inventors.
Thus, the power inherent in present joint inventorship rules could
theoretically provide patients with the very control that they seek in
promoting broader access to patented technology. However, there
97See, e.g., Kotulak, supra note 1, at C1 (noting Amgen's estimated $ 100 million patent);
see also supra note 3 and accompanying text (noting public perception that gene patents are
very valuable)
"See 35 U.S.C. 261 (1994) (noting that patents "shall have the attributes of personal
property."); 35 U.S.C. 262 (providing that "in the absence of any agreement to the contrary,
each of the joint owners of a patent may make, use, offer to sell, or sell the patented invention
within the United States, or import the patented invention into the United States, without the
consent of and without accounting to the other owners.") (emphasis added). However, there
does appear to be some issue as to the whether each co-owner can assign the patent to others
since enforcement of a patent requires joinder of all patent owners. See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss,
Collaborative Research: Conflicts on Authorship, Ownership and Accountability, 53 VAND. L.
REV. 1161,1211-12 (2000).
"See, e.g., Ethicon, Inc. v. Yoon, 64 F.3d 671 (1995); Schering Corp. v. Roussel-
UCLAF SA, 104 F.3d 341, 344 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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remains the legal problem that the present law makes it difficult for
patients to be considered joint inventors. An additional and potentially
more critical problem is a possible change to the legal implications of
joint inventorship that would eliminate the type of control presently
available to joint inventors.
B. Applying Current Law to Patients
1. What is the (Patentable) Invention?
To determine whether patient contributors have a viable claim to
inventorship, it is important first to re-visit what constitutes a
patentable invention. As previously mentioned, the mere idea of a
problem is not sufficient for a patent; a patentable invention is more
complex than merely realizing a problem or observing natural
phenomena.0° However, a simplistic definition of what is patentable is
more elusive without further description of the patent examination
process.
Essentially, a patentable invention is determined based upon the
patent "claims" that conclude the patent application. By definition,
"claims" consist of one or more sentences which define the scope of the
patentable invention for purposes of both patentability as well as for
enforcement of patent rights once a patent issues.1°1 The claims are
central to the patentability determination because they define the
invention; °2 in particular, the PTO compares the claimed invention
with what exists previously (referred to as "prior art") to determine if
the patent application really claims an invention that satisfies the
technical requirements of being new and non-obvious. 103
2. Who Invented the Claimed Invention ?
'"See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text (explaining basic patentability
standards); see also supra note 63 and accompanying text (explaining why patient contributions
constitute unpatentable material).
101See, e.g., Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950)
(a claim in a patent provides the metes and bounds of the right which the patent confers on the
patentee to exclude others from making, using, or selling the protected invention); Coming
Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1257-58 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("A
claim in a patent provides the metes and bounds of the right which the patent confers on the
patentee to exclude others from making, using, or selling the protected invention."); In re Van
Geuns, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1057, 1185 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (noting that claims define scope of
invention); see also 35 U.S.C. 112 (1994) (noting that a patent application "shall conclude with
one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which
the applicant regards as his invention").
"
2However, the claims must also be read in conjunction with the rest of the application
referred to as the "specification." See 35 U.S.C. 112 (1994); Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton
Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1999).
113See 35 U.S.C. 102-03 (1994); see also supra note 36 (describing PTO prior art search).
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In addition to the preliminary issue of patentability, claims are also
critical to determining inventorship, which is typically a preliminary
basis of patent ownership rights. Accordingly, the claims of the patent
are central to determining the validity of patients' claims to
inventorship. Moreover, there may be multiple inventors of patent
claims, with each joint inventor being entitled to equal rights.
Before discussing joint inventorship, fundamental components of
invention, as well as individual inventorship will first be discussed. In
particular, invention is divided into the steps of first conceiving the
invention ("conception"), followed by reducing the invention to
practice ("reduction to practice").' °4 The delineation of these steps
reflects that part of an invention may be primarily mental, or
conceptual, whereas to ensure that an invention functions as intended,
there may need to be a working model created, or some other way to
"reduce" the mental conceptions to practice.
a. Conception
Conception is a critical starting point with respect to determining
inventorship issues. In fact, some courts have referred to conception as
the "touchstone of invention."'0 '  Conception is defined as the
completion of the mental activity involved in formulating the
invention.'0 It requires a mental picture of the invention, which is
sufficiently definite that another person with adequate skill in the area
could understand the invention.'07 Accordingly, conception requires
specificity and a particular solution to a problem, rather than a general
goal or research plan.08  As noted by one court, the conception
requirement is intended to "ensure that patent rights attach only when
an idea is so far developed that the inventor can point to a definite,
particular invention."'3 9 In the area of biotechnology, conception of a
'°4Typically the conception of an invention will be followed by a "reduction to practice"
which involves making the inventive concept work. Although the two steps are considered
separate, in certain areas, such as biotechnology, courts have found that there must be
simultaneous conception and reduction to practice because the realities of finding chemical
compounds are such that the idea of finding a specific compound may be far removed from the
prospect of actually finding such a compound. See, e.g., Amgen v. Chugai, 927 F.2d 1200,
1206 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
'
05See, e.g., Burroughs Wellcome v. Barr, 40 F.3d 1223, 1227-28 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
16!d
07See id. at 1228; see also Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d
1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (defining conception as requiring the "formation in the mind of the
inventor, of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention, as it is
hereafter to be applied in practice").
'Burroughs Wellcome, 40 F.3d at 1228; Sewall v. Walters, 21 F.3d 411, 415 (Fed. Cir.
1994).
'. See, e.g., Burroughs Wellcome, 40 F.3d at 1228
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genetic component requires knowledge of a specific chemical
structure."0
b. Can Patients Conceive the Claimed Invention ?
Although patients typically do not claim sole inventorship of patents,
looking at whether patients could satisfy this standard is nonetheless
helpful in illustrating a gap between patient perceptions and patent law
with respect to inventorship as a whole. As noted earlier in this
section, the first step to determining proper inventorship is to examine
the patent claims. When the steps to determining inventorship are
outlined and applied to patients, it becomes clear that the patients'
perceptions do not match the present patent laws. In most cases, the
actual patent claims do not include any activities that patients directly
performed. For example, patent claims to isolated gene sequences, or
methods of detecting diseases based upon the isolation of gene
sequences, typically require knowledge of biological sciences beyond
the realm of most patients. In addition, although patients may perceive
their efforts to have substantially advanced ultimate accomplishments,
the definition of conception does not extend to those who assist; rather,
conception of the invention requires an actual mental picture of the
claimed invention. A patient who presents the raw material that a
researcher can examine and use to isolate a patented gene is not
presenting anything that can be claimed because her own genetic
material, in its natural state, fails to satisfy the patent law requirement
of novelty."' Moreover, such a patient would fail to satisfy the
requirement for conception of the chemical components of the isolated
genetic material, unless the patient happened to be a genetic research
scientist herself. In most cases, however, the patient's contribution is
more analogous to a general research plan or goal that courts have
dismissed as unpatentable for failing to have the requisite specificity to
constitute a solution to a problem."2
One illustration of the distinction between patient contribution and
patentable invention lies in the legendary case of Moore v. Regents of
the University of California, in which the surreptitious scientists who
removed Moore's spleen and other bodily fluids"3 applied for and
received a patent that claimed a cell line derived from Moore's spleen
"°See, e.g., id. at 1229; Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1206.
"See, e.g., supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text (noting that natural discoveries are
not patentable, although modified genetic material, such as isolated gene sequences, are
patentable).
"
2See Sewall, 21 F.3d at 415.
"
3Over a period of months, Moore contributed blood, skin, bone marrow aspirate, as well
as sperm. See Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 126.
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cells. The patent itself claimed a cell line of T-lymphocytes that are not
naturally occurring, as well as methods of using the cell line to produce
lymphokines.1"4  Although scientists created the cell-line based upon
patient Moore's actual cell, the claim to the artificially created cell line
was not a function of Moore's own mental conception. In addition, the
claimed invention did not claim Moore's cell, nor could it, because
discoveries of naturally existing compounds are not patentable; among
other things, naturally occurring compounds would fail to meet patent
law's novelty requirement."' Accordingly, a claim by Moore to have
either invented the claimed invention, or to have a patentable invention
in his own cells, would fail.
A more recent case, Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hospital, also
provides a good illustration of patient contributions that assist, but do
not invent a patentable compound."6 In this case, parents of children
afflicted with Canavan's disease provided biological material and
financial support to a doctor.'17 Although the doctor ultimately was
successful in isolating the gene responsible for the disease, the patent
that was applied for and granted to the doctor's employer, the Miami
Children's Hospital Research Institute, prevented the free testing that
the patients had envisioned."' Although the patients sued on a number
of legal grounds, including breach of contract and lack of informed
consent, they notably did not include a claim regarding inventorship of
the patent.' Although they engaged in more activities than patient
Moore, they would still fail to meet the inventorship requirement. For
example, many of the patent claims refer to "an isolated nucleic acid
molecule" having certain specific sequences, which the patients would
not have participated in creating since only the doctor isolated the
specific material. 120 None of the patent claims refer to the raw material
from which the doctor determined the isolated material. Moreover, as
in Moore, claims to natural compounds would not be patentable
because natural discoveries cannot satisfy the novelty requirement. 122
"'Seeid. at 127.
"'See, e.g., Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 128-30 (holding
that patents cannot issue for the discovery of phenomena of nature); In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031
(C.C.P.A. 1977).
"
6 See Greenberg, 208 F. Supp.2d at 918.l171d at 921.
"'Id (noting that the plaintiffs were never informed that the hospital intended to seek a
patent).
"'See id. at 921-22 (listing the plaintiffs' allegations).
"
2 See Matalon et al., Aspartoacylase Gene, Protein and Methods of Screening for
Mutations Associated with Canavan Disease, U.S. Patent No. 5,679,635 (Oct. 21, 1997).
.
2 See generally id (containing no claims to raw material).
"'See supra note 115 and accompanying text (explaining that phenomena of nature, even
if unusual, are not patentable).
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3. Are There Joint Inventors?
Although patients alone are unlikely to be considered sole inventors,
the patent law also provides for joint inventorship. In general, joint
inventors must have jointly created the patentable invention. In
particular, the statutory definition of joint inventors states that inventors
may be joint "even though (1) they did not physically work together or
at the same time, (2) each did not make the same type or amount of
contribution, or (3) each did not make a contribution to the subject
matter of every claim of the patent. ' '123 However, case law has imposed
additional requirements, such as the requirement that co-inventors
collaborate in the conception of the invention, as the following section
will explain. 124
a. Conception Requirements for Co-Inventors
A pertinent case to illustrate the requirement of joint collaboration in
conception for co-inventors is the Burroughs Wellcome case, in which
scientists from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) unsuccessfully
tried to claim co-inventorship of the AZT compound, as well as a
method of using it to treat AIDS. 125 Burroughs Wellcome and NIH
scientists, were simultaneously pursuing an HIV cure using different
approaches.126 Burroughs Wellcome's original research goal of finding
a method to treat AIDS would have failed to meet the required
specificity for conception. 12
However, by the time that the Burroughs Wellcome scientists
applied for a patent on the compound AZT, claiming utility against
HIV, they had more than a general hope. Their patent application
could confer the knowledge about AZT to anyone with sufficient
expertise in the area - accordingly, they had conceived and formulated
the idea that AZT had activity that appeared to be useful in treating
HIV. 1
28
NIH scientists claimed that they should be entitled to joint
inventorship status because they had confirmed that AZT was active
12335 U.S.C. 116 (2001).
,
24See, e.g., Burroughs Wellcome, 40 F.3d at 1229-30.
121Id at 1228.
126Id. at 1225 (stating Burroughs Wellcome utilized mouse retroviruses, while NIH used a
live human cell line).
'Id. at 1229.
'
28Id (noting that Burroughs Welcome had "thought of the particular antiviral agent with
which they intended to address the HIV treatment problem" and formulated the idea of the
invention to the point that they could express it clearly in the form of a draft patent
application").
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against HIV in humans, using their live human cell line.' 29 However,
the court found that the invention of using AZT to treat AIDS was
already conceived by Burroughs Wellcome before the NIH
confirmation." 0 In particular, the court noted that the patent application
draft "shows that the idea was clearly defined in the inventors' minds;
all that remained was to reduce it to practice - to confirm its operability
and bring it to market."''3'
In addition, assistance towards a patentable invention in the form
of general ideas and information does not give rise to joint inventorship
because of the lack of participation in the conception of the invention.
For example, one who merely provided ideas and information on what
was currently available on the market was held not to be a joint
inventor of a device which did not use any such information.'32
Similarly, one who made suggestions for potential material to be used
in the creation of a balloon angioplasty catheter was deemed to be "no
more than a skilled salesman," and accordingly, not a joint inventor of a
patent on the catheter.
b. Can Patients Count as Joint Inventors?
The critical question for many patient contributors is whether they can
be joint inventors, such that they can obtain control over the patent.
However, as this section will show, the suggestion that patients have
contributed significantly enough to be rewarded with joint inventorship
lacks substantial basis within the actual law. This section will first
consider the argument that present law can embrace patients within the
definition of joint inventorship. However, this argument ultimately
fails because it overlooks the previously described requirements of
conception. In addition, this section will discuss specific cases in
which courts have addressed the issue of whether patient contributors
constitute joint inventors; however, this section reveals that none of the
case law thus far supports patients' claims. Accordingly, the final
section looks to analogous claims of joint inventorship based on
causation to see if a similar legal theory can assist the patients' claim.
'The two organizations collaborated on one level: the NIH sought compounds from
pharmaceutical companies, including Burroughs Wellcome, to screen, using a unique live HIV
virus. Burroughs Wellcome, 40 F.3d at 1225. Before the patent applications decision,
Burroughs Wellcome had sent a sample of AZT to NIH laboratories for testing with the live
human cell line, although the sample was not identified. Id. at 1226.
"'Id. at 1230.
" d. (citing Haskett v. Colebourne, 671 F.2d 1362, 1365-66 (C.C.P.A. 1982) for the
proposition that enabling patent applications can corroborate conception).
"'Pro-Mold and Tool Co., Inc., v. Great Lakes Plastics, Inc., 75 F.3d 1568, 1575-76
(Fed. Cir. 1996).
"3Hess v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 106 F.3d 976, 981 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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However, this section ultimately concludes that there is no present case
law that supports an inclusion of patient contributors within the current
definition of joint inventorship.
i. Actual Patient Contributor Cases
There are only three published opinions involving the issue of whether
patient contributors can be co-inventors, all arising from the same set of
facts. 3 4  In the first two cases, the defendant Synbiotics Corporation
raised the inventorship issue as a defense to patent infringement.3 ' In
the third case, Brown v. Regents-of the University of California, the
patient initiated an action to correct inventorship of the patent to
include herself.'3 6  Although the courts in each of these cases found
against the patient contributor, the specific rationales help explain the
current problem of with including patient contributors as joint
inventors.
In Synbiotics 1, the opinion addressed a host of procedural issues,
with the court opining on the inventorship issue as merely one of
several invalidity defenses alleged against the plaintiffs motion for a
preliminary injunction.' The inventorship issue was not central to the
court's ultimate denial of the plaintiffs preliminary injunction motion
and appeared to have been ill-framed as a defense.'38 In addition, the
court's opinion on the inventorship issue may have been colored by its
negative perception of the defendant's other claims. 1 9 However, the
court's approach to the inventorship issue in Synbiotics is nonetheless
important because of its impact on subsequent cases.
3
'Although there is an additional opinion involving one of the same patents, the issue of
inventorship based on patient contribution was not considered. See Regents of University of
California v. Hansen, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1473, 1484 n.9 (S.D. Cal. 1994) (noting the additional
argument that the patent should be suspect for failure to give inventorship credit to Marlo
Brown "has been litigated in other cases and the court does not address this irrelevant issue
here").
",See Univ. of Cal. v. Synbiotics Corp., 29 U.S.P.Q.2d 1463, 1466-67 (S.D. Calif. 1993)
[Synbiotics I]; Regents of Univ. of California v. Synbiotics Corp., 849 F. Supp. 740, 741 (S.D.
Calif. 1994) [Synbiotics II].
36Brown v. Regents of Univ. of California, 866 F. Supp. 439 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
"
7Synbiotics claimed, among several other defenses to patent infringement, that the
patent was invalid for failure to include patient Marlo Brown as a joint inventory. Synbiotics I
29 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1466-67. Synbiotics also made the more traditional argument that the patented
invention was invalid on grounds of obviousness or in the alternative, unenforceable. Id. The
procedural context of this case is actually fairly complex - the failure to join an inventor
defense, was merely one of four defenses against the patents' validity or enforcement to oppose
a preliminary injunction motion; in addition, the opinion considered an appeal from the
magistrate judge's order over discovery disputes. Id. at 1463-44.138Id
'See, e.g., id. at 1465 (characterizing the defendant's claims as constituting "delay
tactics").
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The inventorship argument presented in Synbiotics I was whether
patient contributor Marlo Brown was a co-discoverer of the FIV virus
that was used to develop patented diagnostic methods for FIV.
140
However, the patent in question did not claim the FIV virus, but rather,
a methodfor diagnosing the virus. 14' Accordingly, it is not surprising
that the court summarily dismissed the argument that Brown's
contribution of observing that her cats had human AIDS-like symptoms
and bringing them to researchers for study failed to qualify her as a
joint inventor of the claimed invention.14 ' Rather, the court analogized
Brown's contribution to suggesting an idea for a desired result, rather
than a specific method, which has been previously held to be
inadequate for joint inventorship. 4' The court noted that conception
required the idea of the invention's structure, as well as an operable
method of making it.'" Moreover, the court suggested that in this case,
conception might not have been able to be established until the
invention was actually reduced to practice long after Brown's
contribution. 145 The court clarified that:
[a]t most Brown suggested that her cats showed
symptoms of an immunosuppressive disease and
provided ... the infected cats. On the other hand, [the
named inventors'] discovery included the identification
of a complete and operative method for isolating the
new virus, actually isolating the new virus, and a
complete and operative method for diagnosing cats that
"'Id. at 1466. The court noted that "Synbiotics attacks the validity and enforceability of
the ... patent on four grounds: 1) the patentability ... is based solely on the non-obviousness of
the discovery of the FIV virus. Consequently, ... the role of Marlo Brown in the discovery of
the FIV virus is crucial to the determination of the validity and enforceability of the ... patent;
2) Marlo Brown was a co-discoverer of the FIV virus...." Id.
.
4 Neils Peders and Janet Yamamoto, Feline T-Lymphotropic Lentivirus Assay, U.S.
Patent No. 5,118,602 (June 2, 1992) (claiming a "method for diagnosing viral infection in a
susceptible host, said method comprising: obtaining a physiological specimen from said host;
and determining the presence of feline T-lymphotropic virus (FTLV) or antibodies to FTLV in
a physiological specimen from said host').
'See Synbiotics I 29 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1466 (characterizing the allegation of joint
inventorship as "meritless").
"'Id. at 1467 (citing Garrett Corp v. United States, 422 F.2d 874, 881 (Ct. Cl. 1970) and
Amgen v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 9237 F.2d 1200, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
I"Id.
"'
451d (relying heavily on Amgen v. Chugai for the idea that this invention required
simultaneous conception and reduction to practice). However, even if only conception were
required, Brown would likely still have difficulty meeting this test because her idea of a
problem did not include knowledge of the chemical structure of the compound, let alone a
method for detecting the virus as was required by the claims.
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are infected with FIV virus. Brown can hardly be
deemed a co-inventor or discoverer.
46
In the second case, Synbiotics 1I, the inventorship issue was
central to the opinion. 147 In particular, the plaintiffs moved for partial
summary judgment that Marlo Brown was not a co-inventor of the
patent-in-suit, as well as on some propositions of law that flowed from
that presumption. 48 The court considered the inventorship issue more
thoroughly than it did in Synbiotics I, but ultimately came to the same
conclusion, based upon essentially the same principles. 149 In particular,
Synbiotics H found that in the case of patents on genes or chemicals,
the law required simultaneous conception and reduction to practice.'5 °
Patient contributor Brown's status as a non-scientist effectively
excluded her from inventorship under this definition because the
reduction to practice of the relevant genes required skills beyond her
expertise. The court noted that:
Brown admits in her deposition that she made no
contribution to the isolation of the virus or to the
determination of its structure, name, or chemical or
physical properties. In essence, Brown's sole
contribution to the discovery of FIV is that she brought
her sick cats, along with her written observations of the
cats' symptoms to UC Davis with a suspicion that the
cats may have a virus similar to the human AIDS virus.
These facts do not support a claim that Brown is a co-
inventor .......
In the subsequent case, Brown v. Regents of the University of
California, the patient contributor Marlo Brown directly asserted a
claim of co-inventorship in an action to correct the patent
1461d
'
47The opinion addressed the issue of whether the defendant Synbiotics could amend its
answer to add the affirmative defense of license, in addition to the partial summary judgment
issues. See Synbiotics 11, 849 F. Supp. at 741.
"
8In particular, the court considered whether one who is not a co-inventor, such as
Brown could validly confer a patent license. See Id.1'I9 n particular, the court considered whether one who is not a co-inventor, such as
Brown could validly confer a patent license. See Id.
'
50In particular, the court accepted the proposition suggested by plaintiffs that "discovery
of the FIV virus ... is similar to the discovery of a gene or chemical compound. ... Accordingly,
the Court holds that conception, in this case, did not occur until the virus was isolated, or the
concept was reduced to practice." Id.
"'Id (emphasis added).
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inventorship."' Although the Brown case was before a different court
than the Synbiotics cases and purported to address the issue "anew,"'
153
its ultimate conclusion was strikingly similar.5 4  In particular, after
affirming the fact that the principle of simultaneous conception and
reduction to practice should apply in this case, the court concluded that
Brown "at most played a substantial role in the discovery of FIV," but
discounted Brown's role for patent purposes.'55 In particular, the court
noted that because the patents do not only claim discovery of the FIV
virus, but claim "isolation and substantial purification of the virus, as
well as methods for diagnosing the virus by detecting the presence of
the virus itself .... 56 In addition, although the court acknowledged
Brown's "substantial role" in discovering the FIV virus, the court
characterized Brown's role in the patented product as minimal; in the
court's own words: "Ms. Brown is a non-scientist who played no role in
the laboratory work involved in isolating the virus; therefore, regardless
of the value of her research leads, she cannot be deemed to have
contributed to the conception of the inventions covered by the
patents." "!
ii. Analogous Cases Based Upon Causation Theories
Although cases are limited on the issue of patient contributors' status as
inventors, there are nonetheless analogous cases pertinent to the issue.
In particular, patient contributors have claimed that they were the factor
that led to the patented invention, or that the invention could not have
been made but for their contribution. '  In other words, the patient
contributor cases can be analogized to inventorship cases premised on a
causation theory.
The most analogous causation case is Boehringer v. Schering-
Plough, in which the court rejected a defense of patent invalidation
based on failure to join all inventors.'5 9 The patent in this case claimed
a method of growing and isolating a specific pig virus, which the
" 
2Brown, 866 F. Supp. at 439.
" Id. at 441 n.3 (clarifying that the court could not merely follow the prior rulings in the
Synbiotics cases because Ms. Brown was not a party to the prior actions and accordingly could
not be bound to the holdings in those cases as a matter of law).
14"Synbiotics Iand II were opinions of the Southern District of California, while Brown
was an opinion of the Northern District of California. Although the Synbiotics cases were not
legally binding, because both courts were district courts within the same circuit, the Synbiotics
cases would at least have been persuasive authority to the Brown court as a sister district court.
'Brown, 866 F. Supp. at 445.
"56See id.
'
7Id (emphasis added).
'..See supra note 68 and accompanying text (noting patient's claim that he was essential
to the patentable invention because of his own idea that his immune system was unique).
" 
9Boehringer v. Schering-Plough Corp., 984 F. Supp. 239 (D.N.J. 1997).
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plaintiff claimed was instrumental in developing a vaccine for the pig
virus. 60  As in Synbiotics I, the joint inventorship claim arose in the
context of a defense against infringement.' In particular, the defense
argued that the claimed isolation was a collaborative effort, and that but
for the fact that the alleged co-inventors had provided the inoculum
containing the virus, the named patent inventor would never have been
able to inoculate the virus. 162 The court rejected the inventorship claim,
although it agreed with what had been provided:
[t]he court agrees that had Collins and Benfield not
provided Harris with the inoculum containing the virus,
they would not have been able to isolate the virus, but
that does not mean that they should be entitled to joint
inventorship rights. Harris might have obtained
necessary material from Collins and Benfield, but the
patent does not claim a compound. It claims a method
developed exclusively by Harris.'63
The damning fact in this court's analysis of the situation is not that
the patent claimed a method, but that what was claimed was distinct
from what was contributed'6 In this sense, the case is very analogous
to that of patients who contribute material that leads to the discovery of
a patentable compound, but do not contribute to the claimed isolated
compound itself. In both instances, the conception of the claimed
.
6Id. at 244; see also U.S. Patent No. 5,476,778 (issued Dec. 19, 1995) (claiming "[a]
method of growing and isolating swine infertility and respiratory syndrome virus, ATCC-
VR2332, which comprises inoculating the virus on a full or partial sheet of simian cells in the
presence of serum in a suitable growth medium and incubating the inoculated cell sheet at
about 34 degrees C. to 37 degrees C. until CPE is observed.").
16 See Boehninger, 984 F. Supp. at 259. In particular, the opinion disposed of a motion for
a preliminary injunction and a substantial part of the opinion dealt with other issues, including
claim construction and invalidity based on nonobviousness. In fact, obviousness was deemed
the "most compelling challenge" to the patent's validity by the court. Id. at 253. Moreover, the
co-inventorship claim is discussed subsequent to the obviousness discussion under the catchall
heading of "Other Validity Arguments." Id. at 259.
'
6Id. at 260. Although it is possible to argue that the Boehinger did not precisely
foreclose the theory of a causation theory of co-inventorship, the court's handy dismissal of the
claim is nonetheless pertinent to the discussion of whether patient contributors have any claim
that would likely survive. For example, although the court notes that its decision on the issue of
inventorship will not impact the ultimate decision relating to a motion for preliminary
judgment, the court nonetheless described the co-inventorship claim to "lack substantial merit"
and to be "unavailing" as a defense. Boehringer, 984 F. Supp. at 259.
'
6 3
1d.
'64It is noted that the opinion focused on the fact that the patent claimed a method, not a
compound, but the more important point is that the contributors could not have contributed to a
patentable compound. See id.
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invention relates to matter that is performed exclusively by the named
inventor after the contribution.
Another analogous case is Buildex, Inc. v. Kason Industries, Inc.,
in which inventorship once again arose as a defense to patent
infringement. In Buildex, the disputed issue was whether an
individual who recognized a problem could be considered a joint
inventor. The patent in the case related to a hinge-activated switch
assembly and the alleged co-inventor was the first to recognize a
problem with prior switches. 66  However, although both parties
acknowledged that they "would not have solved the ... problem if [the
allegedly omitted inventor] had not raised the problem first, this
scenario is still consistent with the notion that [the named inventor] was
the real inventor. It is one thing to suggest a better mousetrap ought to
be built, it is another thing to build it." '67 Nonetheless, the fact that the
court so easily dismissed this issue without even considering joint
inventorship status suggests that individuals who suggest ideas of a
desirable invention, rather than a complete conception of the actual
patented invention, will find a cold reception before the courts.
IV. ADDRESSING THE PATIENT-PATENT INTERPLAY
A. Should Joint Inventorship Be Extended?
1. Re-Considering Joint In ventorship Cases
Although the actual and analogous cases of joint inventorship regarding
patient contributors have not established any legal rights for such
contributors, it is possible that these cases should be viewed through
the more narrow procedural context in which they were raised, rather
than as whole-sale dismissals of the possibility of including patients
within the definition of joint inventors. Admittedly, the ability of
patients to establish joint conception of genetic sequences is difficult.
However, it should nonetheless be noted that in each of the litigated
cases where joint inventorship has been an issue, it was raised under
procedural burdens that substantially reduced its likelihood of success.
In particular, there is always a presumption that the named inventor of a
patent is the only true inventor - a presumption that can only be
overcome by clear and convincing proof.6' Moreover, in Synbiotics I,
the first published opinion concerning patient contributors, the court
may have been negatively pre-disposed on the issue of inventorship
"'
65Buildex, Inc. v. Kason Indus., Inc., 665 F. Supp. 1021, 1024-25 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
1
66See, e.g., Hess v. Advanced Cardiovascular, 106 F.3d 976, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(noting that the allegation of inventorship must be established by clear and convincing proof).
"'Buildex, 665 F. Supp. at 1025
'
68See, e.g., id.
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because the court perceived the party to be engaging in delay tactics,
rather than legitimate defenses.6 9  This case, in turn, may have been
interpreted over broadly to exclude patient contributors from the
definition of inventors, without accounting for the unique procedural
context of Synbiotics L
Although there is no clear legal precedent for considering patients
to be joint inventors, one case, albeit in a dissent, has in fact suggested
that joint inventorship should be interpreted to embrace this scenario.
In addressing the removal of cells from patient Moore, Judge Mosk
argued that the spirit of the joint inventorship law should embrace
patients such as Moore, regardless of whether they were within the
literal bounds of the inventorship statute.' 0 Mosk argued that "the joint
invention provision guarantees that all who contribute in a substantial
way to a product's development benefit from the reward that the
product brings."''7' However, even he probably realized that this was an
overstatement of the actual inventorship laws, as he conceded that the
patented cell line was primarily the product of the named inventors'
efforts.7 7 Nonetheless, he argued that "no one can question Moire's
crucial contribution to the invention; but forthe cells of Moire's body ...
there would have been no [patented] cell line."'73 Moreover, Mosk
noted that although patient contributors do not further the development
of the product in any intellectual or conceptual sense, "what the patients
did do, knowingly or unknowingly, is collaborate with the researchers
by donating their body tissue. By providing the researchers with
unique raw materials, without which the resulting product could not
exist, the donors become necessary contributors to the product.'
74
Judge Mosk's language is powerful and persuasive, but is not
anchored within the present joint inventorship law. In particular, his
comments overlook the fact that inventorship is a function of the
claimed invention, which is often quite distinct from what patients
contribute. Judge Mosk's description of patients contributing to the end
product is more analogous to assistance that courts have found to lack a
.
69See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text (noting that inventorship issue was
weakly framed). Similarly, the analogous cases based upon causation should also be considered
within their procedural context. For example, the Boehringer case decided the issue of
inventorship on a motion for preliminary injunction; in addition, the issue was couched in the
context of whether the patent should be invalidated for misdesignation of the inventor with
purposely deceptive intent. Boehringer, 984 F. Supp. at 259-60.
"
7 Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal.3d 120, 168-69 (Cal. 1990) (Mosk, J.,
dissenting) (acknowledging that "strictly speaking" patients would not fall within the bounds of
the law, but that the "spirit" of the law should suffice).
'
7 1d. at 169 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
"'Id. at 168.
1731d
17'Id. at 169 (quoting Danforth, supra note 9, at 197).
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sufficient link to the conception of the invention itself.7 To give
patients inventorship status based solely upon their contribution of
starting materials would require a phenomenal change in the law to
overcome the requirement that joint inventors jointly conceive of the
actual invention itself. Accordingly, while Judge Mosk provides good
rhetoric, there remains a large gap between his reasoning and the reality
of the present laws.
2. Commercial Research Realities
Although Judge Mosk's arguments do not reflect present law, they are
nonetheless useful for considering whether patent policy should
consider patients as joint inventors. In particular, the patent system is
intended to foster innovation. 176  Patient contributors currently foster
innovation in areas that are low priorities for research companies who
typically devote more resources to projects with large commercial
impact. 7 7  Patient contributors typically suffer from diseases that
impact limited populations and accordingly are less likely to be
studied. 178 In fact, some patients must solicit and finance researchers to
analyze their biological material.
79
There is some recent precedent for amending the joint
inventorship requirements to adjust patent incentives. However, the
patient contributor concerns are substantially different than those that
animated the recent amendment. In particular, the joint inventorship
'"See supra note 140-57 and accompanying text (describing the Marlo Brown case).
76See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text (describing goals of the patent system).
" Rather, most companies direct research towards diseases that affect large populations,
and hence large potential profits. See, e.g., Robert A. Bohrer & John T. Prince, A Tale of Two
Proteins, 12 HARv. J. L. & TECH. 365, 366-67 (1999); Steven R. Salbu, AIDS and Drug Pricing:
In Search of a Policy, 71 WASH. U. L. Q. 691, 703 (1993). Although there is a mechanism
outside the patent laws that theoretically could encourage companies to research areas that
impact limited populations, the fact that no research was occurring in areas that patient
contributors desired underscores the failure of present laws to provide adequate incentives to
encourage such research. See generally David Duffield Rohde, The Orphan Drug Act: An
Engine oflnnovation?At What Cost, 55 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 125, 126-31 (2000) (describing the
impetus behind Congressional enactment of the Orphan Drug Act to provide economic
incentive for the pharmaceutical industry to invest in research and development of drugs for
rare diseases that otherwise would not allow for recovery of research costs, let alone profits);
see also Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983), codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. 360 (1988)
(providing patent-like benefits for research that will impact small populations). Moreover, the
Orphan Drug Act itself has been criticized, including the fact that it over-compensates some
companies. See supra Rohde, at 133-39; Bohrer & Prince, supra at 382-83; Janice Hogan,
Revamping the Orphan Drug Act: Potential Impact on the World Pharmaceutical Market, 26 L.
& POL'Y INT'L BUS. 523, 530-34. (1995).
178For example, Canavan disease is a rare genetic disorder that almost exclusively strikes
Ashkenazi Jews. See, e.g., Kolata, supra note 59, at A17. Similarly, PXE is a rare genetic
disease. See Fleisher, Patent Thyself supra note 57, at 84.
"
9See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text (discussing patients who spear headed
research efforts or solicited and financially funded research).
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and obviousness sections of the Patent Act were previously amended to
prevent unnecessary invalidation of patents, as well as to ensure that
patents would provide an incentive to collaborate. 8° However, an
amendment to include patients as inventors would likely be highly
controversial. In particular, any amendment to provide rights for
patients would be creating rights for more parties, rather than
cementing the rights of the existing status quo. Major companies had
nothing to lose from the former amendment and plenty to gain; in
particular, the change reduced the danger of losing patent protection
because of diffuse working, arrangements within large companies.
Moreover, because most companies require employees to assign their
rights to inventions, the amended patent laws yielded a bigger patent
pot of gold for many large companies. In addition, whereas many
companies helped to usher the last amendment of joint inventorship
into law, those companies would likely oppose any additional
amendment to include patient contributors, because this would require
sharing the pot of gold.
3. A Potential Shift in the Law
In addition, amending joint inventorship to include patients may be a
dubious proposition because of a potential change in the implications of
joint inventorship. In particular, the recent case of Ethicon v. Yoon
addressed the issue of whether equivalent rights for all joint inventors
is proper in cases where inventors provided differing degrees of
contribution."8 ' Although the Ethicon majority held that a joint inventor
of only a minority of patent claims may nonetheless license the entire
patent, a strong dissent by Judge Newman questions whether this
proposition will continue to hold. 1 2 This case is particularly relevant to
'
80See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 98, at 1180 (describing amendment to joint inventorship
law). Among other things, the Patent Act changed the definition of inventorship to clarify and
further define "joint inventors" who can now qualify to jointly own a patent even if they did not
work together physically, or even make the same type of contribution to the patent. See 35
U.S.C. 116 (2001). At the same time, Congress also altered the standard of obviousness to
allow for serial collaboration within the same organization, such that different working groups
would not thwart patentability of a later group when there was common ownership of a patent.
See Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, 35 U.S.C. 103 (1994); see also W. Fritz Fasse, The
Muddy Metaphysics of Joint Inventorship: Cleaning up After the 1984 Amendments to 35
U.S.C. 116, 5 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 153, 167-72 (1992).
"
8 Ethicon v. Yoon, 135 F.3d 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
'
82Panel decisions, such as Ethicon remain binding precedent on future cases, although
they may be overturned by the court en banc. See UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d
647, 652 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Usually, the Federal Circuit only hears cases en banc when there
are divergent panel decisions. In the case of joint inventorship and its impact on patent
ownership, there is no present sign of an en banc ruling. However, the lack of uniformity
among Ethicon nonetheless is noteworthy in considering whether joint inventorship is the
appropriate concept to strive for, if there is a possibility that current rules will be reversed.
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patient contributors, who are unlikely to have contributed equally to all
parts of the claimed invention. In particular, the differing opinions in
Ethicon suggest that the full ownership rights traditionally
accompanying joint inventorship may no longer continue to exist. To
better understand the potential implications of such a shift in the law
for patient contributors, the dichotomy of views in the Ethicon case will
be further elaborated.
a. The Traditional View: Ethicon Majority Opinion
The majority opinion in Ethicon assumed that Congress's amendment
to the joint inventorship requirements, without a concomitant change to
the rules of joint ownership, must dictate that Congress did not intend
to alter the ownership rules. In particular, the majority suggested that
property rights, including ownership, should continue to be based on
entire patents rather than claims, even if the amended inventorship rules
allow joint inventors to invent only one claim of a patent.'83 In
addition, the majority noted that because the un-amended ownership
provision refers to joint owners of a patent, rather than joint owners of
a claim, a joint inventor to only one claim should enjoy a "presumption
of ownership in the entire patent."' The court explicitly spelled out
the logical extension of this assumption - namely, that the "co-inventor
of only one claim might gain entitlement to ownership of a patent with
dozens of claims" without an express agreement to the contrary. ' The
majority's literal interpretation left no room to consider whether the
traditional rule that joint inventors own equal shares of the patent as
tenants-in-common was still applicable because it was developed
during an era where joint inventors by definition jointly contributed in
equal parts to the invention. 186
b. Challenging Tradition: Judge Newman's Dissent
Contrary to the majority opinion, Judge Newman declared that
"[n]either the law of joint invention nor the law of property so requires"
that joint inventorship be identical to joint ownership.'87 Rather, she
'
3Id. at 1465.
'Id. at 1466.
" This single statement that implies potential inequity is the extent of the majority's
discussion of equitable issues; the majority did not appear to feel that equity warranted further
discussion, or even a more in-depth look at legislative intent behind the inventorship
amendment. Id.
"6previously, the statute had required that "when an invention is made by two or more
persons jointly, they shall apply for patent jointly." Kimberly-Clark v. Proctor & Gamble, 973
F.2d 915 (Fed. Cir. 1992). In addition, this had been interpreted by courts to require joint
collaboration of the invention by two or more people. Id. (citing Shields v. Halliburton, 667
F2d 1232, 1236-37; Monsanto v. Kamp, 269 F. Supp. 818, 824 (D.D.C. 1967)).
" Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1468 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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noted that the result of the majority's reliance on the present statutory
language produced such inequitable results that looking beyond the
literal language was justified. In Judge Newman's view, the 1984
amendments "simply permitted persons to be named on the patent
document" as co-inventors to prevent invalidation of the patent (for
failure to name all inventors), but had no bearing on the previous law of
ownership that only made those who conceived of the entire invention
owners. 88  She explained that the amendment was a technical
amendment to account for a changing commercial reality in which team
research efforts resulted in multiple contributors of an invention who
did not necessarily satisfy the joint conception requirement." In
addition, she noted that the amendment was intended to avoid complex
filing of many separate applications to account for separately conceived
inventions; moreover, she explained that the amendment avoided the
ultimate problem of patent invalidation for failure to name all inventors
who contributed to all of the claims.'19
Judge Newman's rationale focused primarily on equity principles,
rather than specific statutory or judicial authority. In contrast to her
explanation of the amended joint inventorship provision in which she
cited more than ample authority to illustrate that prior law needlessly
invalidated patents, she cited almost no authority for her proposition
that joint owners today must be more than joint inventors under the
statute. For example, she stated that "the law of shared ownership was
founded on shared invention; a situation that admittedly does not here
prevail ... . No theory of the law of property supports such a distortion
of ownership rights.' 91 Similarly, she noted, without citing authority,
that "it is not an implementation of the common law of property, or its
statutory embodiments to treat all persons, however minor their
contribution, as full owners of the entire property as a matter of law.
The law had never given a contributor to a minor portion of an
invention a full share of the originator's patent."' 92  Moreover, she
88She noted that allowing the naming of additional persons as co-inventors under the
amended statute does not "automatically endow" such persons with "full and common
ownership of the entire invention ... . That is not a reasonable consequence of the change in the
law of naming inventors ..... ".Id. at 1469 (Newman, J., dissenting).
'
89Id. at 1469-70 (Newman, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
'9Id (Newman, J., dissenting) (citing numerous cases where patents were invalidated for
failure to include all inventors).
'
9 Id. at 1472 (Newman, J., dissenting). In particular, she noted that prior to the 1984
amendments the joint inventor in this case, Mr. Choi, could not have been named a joint
inventor because he had not conceived and contributed to the entire invention, as was required
under the previous statute. Id. at 1468 (Newman, J., dissenting) (quoting Stearns v. Barrett, 22
F.Cas. 1175, 1181 (C.C.D. Mass. 1816) (Story, J.) (noting that joint invention must be the
simultaneous production of the genius and labor of both parties)).
'
92Id. at 1471.
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seemed to suggest that no specific authority was necessary to support
her point. In particular, she noted that: "By amending [Patent Act
section] 116 in order to remove an antiquated pitfall whereby patents
were being unjustly invalidated, the legislators surely did not intend to
create another inequity. Apparently no one foresaw that judges might
routinely transfer pre-1984 ownership concepts into the changed
inventorship law.""'9
B. Contracting Around Current Inventorship Laws
Regardless of whether the traditional link between joint inventorship
and joint ownership continues, patients can nonetheless obtain patent
rights through current mechanisms that exist outside the patent system.
In particular, patients can contract for outcomes other than the default
patent rules discussed in the previous section. Although patients may
not qualify as joint inventors, because patent ownership is subject to
assignment, patients can negotiate for at least partial assignment of
ownership rights even if they are not joint inventors.
Although still relatively rare, some patients have had the foresight
and ability to contract for part-ownership of prospective patent rights
before granting access to any biological material. In particular, patient-
based group PXE International set up its own bank of biological
material and requires that interested researchers must agree to share any
resulting patent rights before accessing the material. 4 Although a
lawyer for PXE International has cast some doubt on the language of
previous contracts used by the group, the principle of contracting for
different results should be a sound one that is specifically contemplated
by the current patent laws.' 95
While this may provide a ray of hope to some patients who have
the incredible legal foresight to demand a contract for rights in any
potential patent before providing a biological sample, the logistics
would obviously fail to embrace most, if not all, patients who could
attempt to do this. For example, although PXE has established a
convenient mechanism for collecting biological material from patients,
193id
94Fleischer, Seeking Rights to Crucial Gene, supra note 49, at C1.
'
95The attorney for PXE who didn't see the contract until afterwards noted that although
the document stated that "any patent shall be applied for jointly," the implication that this
suggested that the parties were joint inventors should not hold. See Fleischer, Patent Thyself
supra note 57, at 87 (noting that he would have to look more closely at the terms). See also Paul
Smaglik, Tissue Donors Use Their Influence in Deal Over Gene Patent Terms, NATURE, Oct.
19, 2000 (noting that a "joint patent application" had been filed by PXE International, which
had provided scientists at the University of Hawaii with biological material from the PXE's
private blood and tissue bank); 35 U.S.C. 116 (2001) (patents have attributes of personal
property and can accordingly be conveyed).
20041
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
the contract model is atypical. In addition, if there is no pre-existing
patient group for a patient contributor to contact, a single patient would
be at a significant disadvantage in demanding any terms of agreement
from researchers. In fact, the prospect of having to take additional
steps may be a disincentive for those initially inclined to contribute.
Although it is possible to envision a situation where the contractual
approach is more accessible to patients, this possibility may still be
remote in the typical situation where the patient is at a loss for any
alternatives. Accordingly, even if procedures were implemented to
require that patients receive more informed consent regarding the
potential consequences of their donations, it is questionable whether
this would impact their decisions significantly. Detailed disclosure of
potential commercialization, or even the ability to seek counsel, may
have little impact on a contributing patient who has no other present
treatment options. Accordingly, although contracting is a legal option,
it may not be a viable one to patients in this position.
In addition, it is questionable whether the PXE approach is the
optimal approach for either protecting patient rights or for promoting
research. Although the PXE approach does allow patients to share their
contributions and have a "voice" in the dissemination of resulting
technology, it requires a patient-based group, as well as sufficient
numbers of afflicted individuals, to agree to work together. In addition,
allowing patients leverage in terms of licensing patents may further
exacerbate an existing problem in biotechnology, with respect to a
seeming plethora of patents that must be negotiated around before any
work may be done. 96 The additional requirements imposed by a patient
group may actually deter researchers from a certain field because of the
administrative burdens.
C. Moore Thoughts: Patent Sanctions
Another possibility for patient contributors who seek to control access
of patented technology is to penalize patent owners with
unenforceability. For example, Judge Mosk's dissent in Moore
suggested that where a patent was obtained without proper informed
consent, the patent should be unenforceable as a matter of equity.197 Of
course, Mosk was remarking on the unique factual situation of the
96See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 80, at 163; Long, supra note 80, at 827-36; Rai, supra
note 80, at 192-94. See also Janice M. Mueller, No 'Dilettante Affair": Rethinlking the
Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH.
L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2001) (noting that there has been increasing difficulty in accessing patented
research tools and that transaction costs are likely to continue to escalate as companies continue
to acquire proprietary tools).
'
97Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 168 (Mosk, J., dissenting). In addition, he noted that "a patent is
not a license to defraud." Id.
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Moore case in which the patient contributions were obtained almost
entirely under fraudulent pretenses. The Moore case is markedly
different than those where patients donate biological materials to
researchers."' In most cases, patients are arguably misled because of
their failure to comprehend the implications of their contributions.199
However, Mosk's argument for complete unenforceability of a patent is
less compelling without explicit fraudulent overtones. This is
particularly true because unenforceability is considered a very severe
penalty that typically applies only to egregious conduct during patentprocurement.90
In addition, while general equity principles may provide
justification for a change in the law, the typical circumstances where
courts find patents unenforceable do not readily embrace Mosk's
suggestion. Currently, the conduct that gives rise to unenforceability is
fraudulent procurement of the patent, sometimes referred to as "fraud
on the PTO;"' O' moreover, only if fraud rises to the level of inequitable
conduct will the high penalty of total unenforceability of a patent be
exacted.2 °2 In particular, the fraud must be considered material to the
patentability analysis, meaning that the information would have been at
least relevant to a reasonable patent examiner's determination of
patentability, if not precluding patentability altogether.0 3 In addition to
'See supra notes 39-49 and accompanying text (describing sample scenarios for patient
contributions).
'"
99See supra notes 56-68 and accompanying text (describing patient perceptions).201See infra note 201.
"'The other situation where fraud may arise in a patent context involves antitrust claims,
although such a case typically requires more than fraudulent procurement of a patent.
Accordingly, because of the remoteness of this, it is not discussed within this section. See M.
Eagles Tool Warehouse, Inc. v. Fisher Tooling Co., Inc., 203 F. Supp.2d 306, 317'(D.N.J.
2002).
2 See Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting that loss of a
patent is a justified penalty for inequitable conduct because the statutory period of exclusivity
was sought through improper means). This is a particularly severe penalty because unlike
defenses against the patent's invalidity, an accusation of inequitable conduct of even some
claims will make the entire patent unenforceable. See Kingsdown v. Hollister, 863 F.3d 867
(Fed. Cir. 1988); 35 U.S.C. 116 (2001) (noting that invalidity of one claim does not impact the
validity of the other claims); see also Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chem. Co., 722 F.2d 1556
(Fed. Cir. 1983) (noting that while underlying conduct that renders a patent unenforceable may
later be purged, the patent is permanently unenforceable). Moreover, inequitable conduct
during the procurement of one patent may taint related patents, making them also
unenforceable. See Consolidated Alum. Corp. v. Foseco Intern, Ltd., 910 F.2d 804 (Fed. Cir.
1990). The severity of the penalty is also reflected by the stringent level of proof required; there
must be clear and convincing evidence of intentional misrepresentation or withholding of
material facts to form the basis of an inequitable conduct charge. See, e.g., In re Harita, 847
F.2d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (noting that violation of duty of disclosure must be established
by clear and convincing evidence).203See, e.g., Merck & Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 873 F.2d 1418, 1421 (Fed Cir.
1989); see also 37 C.F.R. 56 (providing specific criteria on what constitutes information that is
material to patentability). Typically, acts that could form the basis of such a claim include
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being material to patentability, the law of inequitable conduct requires
an actual intent to deceive the PTO because complete unenforceability
of a patent is such a severe penalty .2  However, in the case of failing to
disclose patient contributions, unless the law changes with respect to
whether patients can jointly conceive of an invention, failure to
disclose the identity of patients, or even their contributions, would not
rise to the level of material information for patentability purposes.
Although patients believe that but for their actions, no patentable
invention would have been conceived in the first instance, this
information is not material to whether the ultimate invention is
patentable. In addition, allowing information that is not material to the
patentability analysis to be the basis for inequitable conduct runs
counter to the traditional basis for such unenforceability. Moreover,
it should be noted that allegations of fraud are considered to be a
"much-abused and too often last-resort allegation" already, without
pushing the boundaries of what is considered fraud.
In addition, even if the patent laws were amended to make patents
unenforceable if patient contributions were not properly disclosed to
the patent office, it is unclear whether this would be an optimal
approach. In particular, for patients who want a share of patent profits,
creating a new rule for unenforceability would negate any such hope of
profits. Nonetheless, if patients cannot be considered joint inventors,
an unenforceability rule might provide a helpful bargaining platform
for some patients. Accordingly, perhaps patients should advocate a
new patent rule requiring all patent applicants to disclose the extent of
patient contributions to the invention, as well as what compensation, if
. • / .. 201
any, has been provided for such contributions. Such a rule would
represent a major shift in the law of unenforceability. However, it is
mentioned as one potential pathway that could be further developed
into a useful tool for patients.
D. Considering Analogous Areas
affirmative misrepresentations of material fact, failure to disclose material information, or
submissions of intentionally misleading information. Moreover, information that is not prior art
is typically considered to not be material, even if the information might have made a patent
examiner consider the invention unpatentable. See, e.g., Northern Telecom v. Datapoint Corp.,
908 F.2d 931, 934-35 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Environmental Designs v. Union Oil, 713 F.2d 693,
996-97 (Fed Cir. 1993); Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp, 845 F.2d 981 (Fed Cir 1988).
2 See Tol-O-Matic v. Proma Produkt-Und Mktg., 945 F.2d 1546, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1991);
Halliburton v. Schlumberger, 925 F.2d 1435, 1439 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
2
"See supra note 203.
2
'rSee FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., 835 F.2d 1411 (Fed. Cir. 1987); see also
Burlington v. Dayco, 849 F.2d 1418, 1421 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (noting that "charging inequitable
conduct in almost every major patent case has become an absolute plague").
207See generally 35 C.F.R. 1.56 (providing current rules of information disclosure).
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This section considers alternative approaches to address the concerns of
patient contributors. In particular, this section broadens the inquiry to
consider analogous problems in other disciplines, as well as patent law
itself. For example, problems in the definition of scientific authorship
offer a parallel situation to the problem of including patient
contributors within the definition of joint inventors. Similarly, some of
the assertions of patient contributors mirror claims of database owners
who seek protection for their compilations of factual information that
are currently unprotected by patent or copyright laws, but which may
soon be entitled to sui geneiis protection. Also, the situation of patient
contributors bears striking resemblance to that of indigenous
communities who have had their biological material taken from them
without compensation, but for whom there are now growing legal
strategies to counter this phenomenon. Finally, this section returns to
patent law to consider the analogous issue of all situations where
genetic gold-diggers are able to obtain patent rights, rather than
focusing on the smaller subset of gold-diggers involved with patient
contributors. This final section's suggestion complements the
discussions of appropriate credit and proper incentive in other areas,
and returns full circle to the realm of patent law, in proposing a
reevaluation of inventorship of isolated genetic material.
1. Scientific Authorsip
The issue of whether the authorship credit of scientific articles should
be adjusted to better reflect changing times offers an important parallel
area of consideration. Although the standards for patent inventorship
and scientific authorship are distinct, both require some type of
novelty.08 In addition, both provide a reward to individuals for their
innovation, albeit with different types of rewards. For example,
scientific authorship does not convey the same types of monetary
rewards typically associated with patents. Rather, in the scientific
2
'°See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text (explaining the patentability
requirements of novelty and nonobviousness); Authors, CELL, at
http://www.cell.cornumisc/authors.shtm (noting that only "novel results" in the area of
experimental biology are considered for publication); How to getpublished in Nature, NATURE,
at http://www.nature.cominature/submit/get published/index.html (requiring "original scientific
research" of "outstanding importance" that has not been previously reported); Information and
Help for Science Authors, at http://www.sciencemag.org/feature/contribinfolhome.shtml
(noting publication requirement of "best original scientific research," with priority given to
"papers that reveal novel concepts of broad interest"). In addition, it is possible to receive a
patent and publish an article concerning the same invention. However, a patent application
must be filed no later than one year from the date of the publication, or first public disclosure.
See 35 U.S.C. 102(b) (1994). In addition, the rule for most countries outside the United States
prohibit patents that are applied at any time after the date of publication. See, e.g., Convention
on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 4, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 270 arts. 54-55.
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arena, the reward is not monetary, but more a matter of attribution that
translates into positive professional recognition. 209 However, a recent
challenge in both areas has been the changing nature and types of
210
contributions. In particular, the increasing collaboration among
scientists that impacted the inventorship definition in patent law also
impacted the definition of scientific authorship.
The increasing collaborations among scientists produced problems
in determining authorship because the traditional model assumed a
single author was solely responsible for all of the work involved.21' If
the definition of authorship were narrowly construed to approximate
the prior model of a single author, some contributors were denied any
authorship credit. The unfairness of a narrow definition of scientific
authorship is analogous to claims of patient contributors who, "while
not engaged in the conceptualization and writing of a certain
publication, still made such work possible."2 2 Alternatively, a broader
scope of authorship would inequitably inflate the term by recognizing
minor and major contributions identically. 213 The broader authorship
concept is also somewhat analogous to the patent context because a
wider scope of patent inventors would convey greater rights to a larger
group of people and possibly be inconsistent with established principles
of inventorship.
The similar problems in the scientific and patent context,
combined with actual modifications of scientific authorship suggest
that the patent concepts may be usefully modified, based upon the
analogous area of scientific authorship. In particular, specific
organizations responsible for publishing scientific journals have
adjusted their definition of authorship to better reflect current research
realities. For example, some leading scientific journals such as the
JOURNAL OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (JAMA) have substituted the word
contributor for the word and concepts typically associated with the
word "author" to provide adequate attribution to each person "who has
added usefully to the work. 2 14  The number of contributors is not
'
0See, e.g., Mario Biagioli, Rights or Rewards? Changing Context and Definitions of
Scientific Authorship, 27 J.C. & U.L. 83, 84-85.2
'See, e.g., id. at 83 (noting the impact that the increasing collaborative environment
within academia has for the definition of scientific authorship, as well as for patent law).
21 1d. at 92 (noting that changing research methods created problems in the definition of
scientific authorship because it became difficult to conceive of a single author who "had the
idea, did the work, wrote the paper, and took credit and responsibility ...
"2m at 93.2
'
3For example, where there was a substantial collaboration, a long list of authors failed
to distinguish those who provided the initial impetus for the project from those who oversaw
the project, from those who carried out the instructions of others. Accordingly, to some authors,
creating too many authors actually diluted the authorship credit.21 4Biagoli, supra note 209, at 96 (quoting Rennie et al., When Authorship Fails: A
VOL.7.2:185
PA TIENT-BA SED DISCO VERIES
limited, but each contributor's actual contribution, expressed as a
211
numerical figure, is denoted on the article's first page.
The evolving definition of scientific authorship may convey some
important lessons to the patient contributor scenario. In particular, the
principles supporting the new definition of contributors could be
utilized to redefine joint inventorship in a manner that encompasses
patient contributors. Just as the prior definition of scientific authorship
was too narrow to some contributors, so to the present definition of
joint inventorship is too narrow to include patient contributors. The
parallel is particularly compelling for patient contributors in cases
where but for their assistance - even if it does not rise to the level of
inventorship - the patentable invention would not have been
discovered, or discovered as quickly. 216  Even the cases that deny
inventorship status to patients acknowledge that they did provide some
contribution towards the invention." 7 Accordingly, the contribution
scenario for scientific authorship would seem to more readily embrace
and acknowledge patients' efforts. Although the precise definition of
contribution would likely be difficult to agree upon, a broad definition
that included all whose contributions were essential to development of
the patented invention would be a starting point for including patient
contributors .218
However, the JAMA approach would likely not be incorporated
wholesale into patent laws because of important distinctions between
scientific authorship and patent inventorship. As a practical matter,
because scientific authorship is not a legal concept, it was easier to
modify. Moreover, patent inventorship typically conveys actual
Proposal to Make Contributors Accountable, 278 JAMA 579, 582 (1997)).
215id
"'See supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text (discussing the research value of using
isolated populations to isolate genetic links); supra notes 170-73 (discussing Judge Mosk's
arguments concerning patient Moore's pivotal role in the patented compound).
2 7See, e.g., supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text (noting court's recognition of
patient contribution, although ultimately denying inventorship rights to her); see also supra
notes 158-67 (discussing cases where inventorship was denied to those who arguably were
essential to the development of the patented invention).
'For example, conception could be re-conceived to include all persons who were
necessary contributors to a patented invention. See generally Moore, 51 Cal.3d at 169 (Mosk,
dissenting). However, it is acknowledged that this would likely be difficult because even in
cases where patients supply an important contribution, it is possible that they only accelerate a
result, but that the result could have been created without them. See generally supra notes 42-
43 (noting that scientists sought certain groups to assist in the acceleration of research).
2There is more flexibility to provide differing approaches to scientific authorship since
there have historically been differing laws for different disciplines and institutions, in contrast
to the uniform federal definition of joint inventors. See Biagioli, supra note 209, at 83 (noting
that "definitions of scientific authorship, far from being codified in a corpus of doctrine like
intellectual property law, do change across disciplines and institutions"). In addition, while
patent rights may be transferred contractually, scientific credit and authorship are not
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rights that impact others, whereas scientific authorship primarily
provides recognition to individuals.2 0  The patent rights that are
inherently tied to joint inventorship accordingly do not dovetail with
the concept of proportional contribution. In particular, the contribution
approach does not resolve the apportionment of ownership rights,
which are currently directly tied to inventorship.221
A possible modification of the scientific contribution approach to
the patent context would be to provide differing ownership interests,
based upon the amount of contribution. However, this is only
suggested as a starting point for discussion since it may be difficult to
build consensus on definitions of contribution and ownership. In
addition, if all contributors were provided partial ownership interests,
rather than the current control provided to joint inventors, patients may
have less control over the total outcome than under the traditional joint
inventorship and ownership model. Nonetheless, a modified
contribution standard may be a much more realistic option. In
particular, whereas joint inventorship is a difficult threshold for patients
to meet, a contribution standard might be more easily satisfied.
Additionally, although partial ownership rights would not completely
satisfy their desire for control, some rights would at least begin to
address some of the current problems with patient perceptions. Perhaps
of even greater value, though, is that so long as some rights are
provided to patient contributors, they may enable patient contributors to
negotiate more effectively for rights that better fulfill their ideals and
goals. At a minimum, any rights provided to patients at this point
would be better than the default scenario that the PXE group is
contracting against, in which patients are presumed to have no rights at
all. Of course, the precise balance of rights is the linchpin of an
eventual solution, but the scientific authorship scenario should
encourage efforts to consider solutions outside the current framework
of joint inventorship.
2. Database Rights
Another analogous issue to the patient contributors' lack of
compensation exists in the fringes of the copyright arena.21 2  In
considered property rights, but rather, are considered inseparable from the actual author. Id. at
91 (noting that while intellectual property rights may be transferred contractually, scientific
authorship is seen as inalienable from the original author).
210See id. at 97 (noting that one of the reasons the new definition of "contributor" works
for scientific authorship is that the system is one based on rewards, not rights).221 See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text (explaining the correlation between
inventorship and ownership).221In addition, although beyond the scope of this article, the consideration of joint
inventorship rights for patient contributors could potentially be compared with those of joint
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particular, the patient contributor claims mildly echo those of database
compilers who allege that they should be entitled to copyright
ownership, or at least copyright-like protection that would provide
recognition of their work.23  In both cases, the claims are essentially
that effort or natural ability should be rewarded under intellectual
property laws, or under new laws that provide similar scope of
protection. Current copyright law does not protect mere effort itself;
rather, copyright protection only applies when there is a sufficient
modicum of creative expression.224 The underlying data, as opposed toS . 221
the expression or presentation of data, is not protected. In addition,
while contract law could be utilized in both instances, a contract
authors, who are provided analogous protection under copyright laws, albeit with important
distinctions. For example,- joint copyright owners must account to all joint authors, whereas
joint inventors currently have no such requirement. Compare 17 U.S.C. 203 (2000) with 35
U.S.C. 262 (1999). In addition, the respective standards for protection, as well as scope of
protection are different. See infra note 256 and accompanying text (noting that the patentability
threshold of novelty is higher than the copyright standard of originality and that the scope of a
patent is broader than the scope of copyright protection). Nonetheless, the issue of joint
authorship in the copyright arena is a similarly contentious issue. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note
98, at 1161; see also F. Jay Dougherty, Not a Spike Lee Joint? Issues in the Authorship of
Motion Pictures Under U.S. Copyright Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 225 (2001) (examining
contributors to motion pictures who currently fail to qualify as co-authors under the copyright
laws and proposing alternative rules of copyright ownership); Mary LaFrance, Authorship,
Dominance, and the Captive Collaborator. Preserving the Rights of Joint Authors, 50 EMORY
L.J. 193 (2001) (proposing a narrowing of the definition of joint authorship that is arguably
more consistent with the language and purpose of copyright law); Russ VerSteeg, Defining
Author'For Purposes of Copyright, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1275 (1996).
223 See, e.g., Status of Intellectual Property Law and the Internet, 146 CONG. REC. S 10986-
06, 106th Cong., 2d Sess. (Oct. 25, 2000) (arguing that creators of databases invest substantial
resources in creating the databases and need legal protection akin to copyright protection to
ensure that investment in databases will not diminish, to the detriment of society); Legal
Protection for Data Bases, 143 CONG. REC. S10263, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 1, 1997)
(arguing that legal protection of databases is an important national and international issue,
based, in part on a report by the U.S. Copyright Office); Statement of Hon. Carlos Moorhead,
The Database Investment and Intellectual Property Anti-Piracy Act of 1996, 142 Cong. Rec. E
890, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (May 23, 1996) (commenting that compilations of factual material
are "absolutely indispensable to the American economy on the verge of the new century" and
that because of changes in copyright law, new legislation is necessary to continue to provide
incentives for a strong U.S. market). In addition, there is some international pressure to provide
protection for database creators because the EU has already provided similar protection and the
EU Directive stipulates that database protection in Europe will only be provided to foreign
database owners if their home countries have adopted similar legislation, See Directive
96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of the EU of 11 March 1996 on the
Legal Protection of Databases, 1996 O.J. L (77) 20, reprinted in THE NAT'L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, A QUESTION OF BALANCE: PRIVATE RIGHTS IN SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DATABASES
(1999), Appendix A, recital 56.2
1
4Feist Publ'n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1991).225See id. See also 17 U.S.C. 102 (1994) (limiting copyright protection to "original works
of authorship that are fixed in any tangible medium of expression").
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approach is necessarily less comprehensive because it requires
negotiation of every individual situation.
226
Database owners have argued for a change in the law to protect
the data itself. In particular, it has been argued that without specific
protection of database rights, there will actually be a disincentive to
create stores of factual material that are, in fact, in society's best
interest.227 In addition, while a database owner may endeavor to keep
the database proprietary, the risk that others could copy substantial
parts without legal ramification has been cited as an additional reason
for the need of another legal right. 28  Accordingly, several proposals
have been introduced before Congress that provide a so-called
"database right" to these owners.22 9 However, the propriety of such a
right remains controversial.3
Although the underlying calls to recognize efforts that currently
fall short of intellectual property protection is similar to that expressed
in the patient contributor situation, the situations diverge on the
underlying issues. For the typical database owner, the increased
protection is desirable from a purely financial standpoint; the owner
desires to recoup investment and maximize profit. However, patients
who would contribute to a database are not solely interested in
monetary concerns. Rather, patients are also interested in ensuring that
2 6See supra notes 194-96 and accompanying text (describing the ability of patients to
contract for rights relating to their contributions, but also recognizing that most patients would
be unable to effectively do so). Moreover, database owners have asserted that contract rights
alone are inadequate protection.227See supra note 223 and accompanying text (noting arguments in support of a database
right). 228Id.229See, e.g., Consumer and Investor Access to Information Act, H.R. 1858, 106th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1999); Collections of Information Antipiracy Act II, H.R. 354, 106th Cong., 2d
Session (1999) (proposing to amend the copyright act to provide protection for database
information); H.R. 1858 106th Cong., 1st Sess., (1999); Database Investment and Intellectual
Property Antipiracy Act, H.R. 3531. 104th Cong. (1996); Collections of Information Antipiracy
Act, H.R. 2652 (1997); see also A QUESTION OF BALANCE, supra 223, at 73-110 (1999)
(providing an overview of federal bills, as well as specific recommendations from the National
Research Council); Michael Freno, Note, Database Protection: Resolving the U.S. Database
Dilemma with an Eye Toward International Protection, 34 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 165 (2001)
(providing an overview of the various legislative proposals, as well as the international
framework for database protection and a suggested compromise proposal for a database right).
23For example, some believe that it is inappropriate to create a right for those who the Supreme
Court has clearly held to be outside the Copyright Act. See A QUESTION OF BALANCE, sUpra
note 223, at 57 (noting that some argue that Congress lacks the ability to extend copyright
beyond the minimum necessary to provide sufficient incentive to authors to make their works
available); J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data, 50
VAND. L. REV. 51 (1997) (endorsing some type of legal relief to assist in the creation and
distribution of electronic data, but opposing the creation of any strong legal barriers to entry in
the field).
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their contributions will result in treatments that are publicly available."23'
In addition, unlike the pure database situation, the information
available from a patient database may .not be commercially valuable in
the first instance. Rather, further research may be required before any
commercial value is attained. Accordingly, the database model is not a
direct corollary for the issues of patient contributors. In addition, none
of the proposed database rights would satisfy the goals of patients. In
particular, all of the proposals for enhanced legal protection thus far
merely protect another from copying the contents of the database; none
would demand that rights be provided to the initial database owner for
12
any derivative products.
Nonetheless, the fact that patient contributor concerns are not
presently addressed in legislative proposals does not foreclose that
option. Indeed, consideration of alternative viewpoints as to why a
database right should be adopted may be productive for the present
database proponents as well. In addition, collaboration with database
proponents may be fruitful for patients because there is already strong
political impetus behind the proposals. Alternatively, patient
contributors can consider the legislative proposals of database
proponents as merely an example of a new sui generis system of
protection; patients can propose their own legislation that is more
233tailored to their concerns.
3. Bio-Piracy of Indigenous Populations
The patient-patent problem is also strikingly similar to the global
problem regarding bio-piracy of indigenous populations. In both
situations, those who provide or facilitate the provision of raw
materials that result in a patentable composition are typically denied
23 See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text (noting that patient contributors want
and expect the results of their contributions to be freely available to others).
1
32See supra note 229 (noting proposals for a database right).
.
33Of course, sui geneis intellectual property protection that provides analogues to both
patent and copyright law exists beyond the database issue. The most analogous area would be
the Orphan Drug Act, which provides patent-like exclusivity for drugs that might not otherwise
be developed by large pharmaceutical companies because of limited the scope of diseases.
Although the Orphan Drug Act is premised on providing a reward to the company who creates
a new discovery, perhaps an amendment of the Act itself, or a similar approach, could be
helpful in providing an incentive to companies, as well as a reward to patients. Although
further consideration of this may be fruitful, it is presently beyond the scope of this article.
However, for some useful information on the current Orphan Drug Act, see Rohde, supra note
177, at 125; Bohrer & Prince, supra note 177 at 365. However, it should be also noted that the
underlying premises of this Act have been questioned. See, e.g., John Flynn, The Orphan Drug
Act: An Unconstitutional Exercise of the Patent Power, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 389 (1992).
Moreover, whether a suigenefis approach is even proper, is an additional issue with respect to
database protection. See Jacqueline Lipton, Matters of Fact.: Refocusing the Database Debate
(manuscript on file with author).
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any rights in a resulting patent. The parallel situation is particularly
interesting since the patent-owner in both cases is typically a relatively
large life-science company that does not interact directly with the
contributors. In addition, just as this Article has explored whether
providing property rights would advance the cause of patient
contributors, so too have advocates of indigenous populations
considered granting property interests for indigenous populations under
either traditional schemes of intellectual property protection, or via sui
generis legislation.235
The criticisms of patient contributors are very similar to the
complaints waged against companies criticized for taking knowledge
and biological material from indigenous populations of other countries.
The bad press that is beginning to circulate concerning patents derived
from patient contributors also echoes the negative press that companies
face regarding the use of indigenous knowledge and biological
materials. 2 6 In addition, just as well-publicized incidents of bio-piracy
based upon indigenous agricultural resources have created distrust, the
patient contributors who are used without reward are also beginning to
show signs of distrust and reluctance as well.237 As already seen in the
context of indigenous contributions, when trust deteriorates,
cooperation is stymied and ultimately, greater knowledge to society
may be frustrated.238
The problems that patients face in attempting to contract for
desired results are also similar to those of indigenous groups who
attempt to contract with the multi-national groups. In both of these
situations, any contract entered into is unlikely to be a contract between
239
equal parties. In addition, both situations share a fundamental
234See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text (noting the fact that many patient
contributions ultimately are owned by corporations because researchers are often required to
assign all interests as part of their employment agreement).235See, e.g., Michael J. Huft, Comment, Indigenous Peoples and Drug Discovery
Research: A Question of Intellectual Property Rights, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 1678 (1995)
(considering whether contribution of indigenous knowledge would constitute joint inventorship
under the patent laws); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Of Seeds and Shamans: The Appropriation of the
Scientific and Technical Knowledge of Indigenous and Local Communities, 17 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 919 (1996) (critiquing the present patent and plant breeder rights' regimes as inappropriate
answers to appropriation of knowledge of indigenous communities).
23These companies were often charged with accusations of biopiracy and at a minimum,
had public relations problems. See Peter Drahos, Indigenous Knowledge, Intellectual Property
and Biopiracy: Is a Global Bio-Collecting Society the Answer? 6 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REP. 245
(2001).
.
37See supra notes 56-68 and accompanying text (describing negative patient perceptions
to the discovery that patents exclude them from medical treatment).
23Drahos, supra note 236, at 246-47.239See id. at 267 (noting that "clearly, a contract between an indigenous group and a
multinational corporation is not a contract between equally well-resourced parties"); see also
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problem in contract negotiations because the information disclosed is
valuable, but of unknown value at the time of negotiation. Admittedly,
the knowledge disclosed reduces uncertainty for companies searching
for patentable genes. However, there remains some degree of
uncertainty in whether the company that obtains the contributions can
actually harness the knowledge because of a number of additional
factors ranging from scientific expertise, to the competitive market,
patent concerns, and the nature of science itself.2 40
One approach to the unequal bargaining power has been utilized in
both situations as well. In particular, the idea of a collecting society or
agency has been utilized or proposed in both areas, although it is not
the norm yet for either. For example, as previously mentioned,
potential patient contributors with PXE created their own collecting
society that wielded sufficient influence to demand that researchers
agree to share patent rights before providing access to any biological
241materials. In addition, even in the case of the Canavan contributors,
there was a smaller-scale organization of similarly situated patients,
although the group did not attempt to leverage their numbers.242
Nonetheless, both situations reflect proposals that have been suggested
for addressing the parallel issues encountered with indigenous
populations. Namely, there have been suggestions for the creation of a
global bio-collecting society to better integrate efforts as well as
provide enhanced bargaining abilities during contractual negotiations 43
Because of the parallels, the more extensive lessons from
contributions of indigenous populations could be considered, rather
than approaching the patient contributor problem anew. In addition,
although bio-piracy problems often focus on preserving biodiversity,
which is not typically an issue for patient contributors, there is prior
experience and even an international context that provides a basis for
the sharing of research benefits with contributors. For example, the
Sarah Laird, Contracts for Biodiversity Prospecting, in Biodiversity Prospecting 99 (describing
the contractual approach, as well as potential problems for indigenous companies).
2
"°See Drahos, supra note 236, at 247.241See supra note 49 (describing the PXE contractual approach). In addition, PXE
actually attempted to take their approach to the global level. See, e.g., Andy Coghlan, People
With Inherited Diseases are Ready to Challenge Pro-Lifers Over the Future of Medical
Research, NEW SCIENTIST, Feb. 2, 2001, at 4 (noting attempts to create a global alliance to
represent patients with rare hereditary conditions that was presented by PXE International
founders at a BioVision meeting on Biotechnology in Lyons, France).
242See supra note 48 and accompanying text (describing the fact that Canavan patients
organized the collection of biological materials from a pool of patients to accelerate research
progress).24 3See Drahos, supra note 236, at 247-249. In addition, even if there is no official
collecting society, another approach that can be borrowed from the bio-piracy area is to create
and widely distribute model contract agreements. See, e.g., Downes et al., Biodiversity
Prospecting Contract, in BIODIVERSITY PROSPECTING 255-87 (1993).
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Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) promotes sharing research
results - it provides that member states should take "legislative,
administrative or policy measures ... with the aim of sharing in a fair
and equitable way the results of research and development and the
benefits arising from the commercial and other utilization of genetic
resources with the Contracting Party providing such resources.
244
Similarly, the Human Genome Organization has emphasized that
researchers should share the benefits of their research with subjects
who have assisted in the enterprise.245  In addition, individual
corporations have taken steps to compensate indigenous communities
246in some circumstances.
4. Re-Defining Inventorship of Isolated Genetic Material
A final analogous area to consider is a reevaluation of inventorship of
all isolated genetic material, regardless of patient assistance. In
particular, this section suggests that the current law, which recognizes
the one who isolates a genetic compound as the creator of a patentable
composition, should be questioned. While this may seem to be a
radically different approach, as well as one that would be resisted
strongly by established pharmaceutical and genomic companies, it
nonetheless should be considered as an alternative in the re-
conceptualization of a framework that provides proper incentives.
This proposal stems from the under-current to patient contributor
claims that named inventors of patents based on patient contributions
are over-compensated. Interestingly, with the exception of groups such
as PXE, patients typically do not seek inventorship rights in the first
instance. Rather, they assume and expect that research will just result
in greater good for all. Accordingly, patients' claims to joint
inventorship are more typically an attempt to realign perceived
2
"CBD art. 15(7); see also Council Directive 98/44 on Legal Protection of
Biotechnological Inventions 1998 OJ. (L 213) 13 (providing that materials taken from patients
for patenting should at least be acknowledged); Francesca Grifo & David Downes, Agreements
to Collect Biodiversity for Pharmaceutical Research: Major Issues and Proposed Prilnciples, in
BRUSH & STABINSKY, VALUING LOCAL KNOWLEDGE 281-304 (1996). Interestingly, the CBD
also offers a suggestion on another topic that relates to patient contributions - informed consent.
In particular, the CBD provides that "access to genetic resources shall be subject to prior
informed consent." Id. at Art. 15(5). As discussed earlier, however, whether consent is
meaningful is a complex and thorny issue.
245See Human Genome Organisation, HUGO Ethics Committee, Statement on Benefit-
Sharing (April 9, 2000), at http://www.hugo-intemational.org/hugo/benefit.html; see also Paul
Smaglik, Genetic Diversity Project Fights for Its Life... As Companies are Urged to Share
Benefits, 404 NATURE 912 (April 27 2000).
..
6See, e.g., Stephen King et al., Biological Diversity, Indigenous Knowledge, Drug
Discovery & Intellectual Property Rights, in BRUSH & STABINSKY, VALUING LOCAL
KNOWLEDGE (describing different compensation strategies that have been used by Shaman
Pharmaceuticals that extend beyond traditional post-commercialization profit sharing).
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inequities. The patients perceive that their provision of unique raw
material is at least as important, if not more important than the
activities of scientists who isolate the patentable sequence.247 While the
patient claims admittedly are based on intuitive logic, this section
suggests that they can be grounded within patent law principles or at
least presented as a proposal to reform patent law principles regarding
inventorship of biotechnology.
To put the objections of patient contributors in the appropriate
intellectual property jargon, they suggest that isolation of genetic
material is not inventive, or at least no more inventive than their own
contributions of raw material that scientists use for the isolation
process. This assertion extends beyond pure inventorship into the area
of patentability, including whether such compounds are truly novel.
While most practicing attorneys likely would dismiss this suggestion as
untenable because of extensive precedent holding otherwise, that is a
circular argument.2 48 However, the patentability of isolated compounds
and genetic sequences has historically been highly controversial, even
if the legal challenge has shifted from appropriate subject matter to
technical patentability requirements. 
249
The perception that isolated genetic sequences lack sufficient
inventive quality to merit patent protection reflect not only the views of
a few patients, but also an unsettled international issue. In contrast to
the broad patentability of genetic material under United States law,
other countries have declared such material to be unpatentable for lack
of sufficient novelty or utility.25° In countries with more restrictive
patenting of genetic material, the inventorship issue is possibly less of
an issue. However, the patient contributor situation in combination
2
11See Brown, 866 F. Supp. at 445 (noting that patient believed that her contribution was
crucial to the conception of the patented invention); see also supra note 68 and accompanying
text (describing patients who consider their contribution to be critical to the patented
invention).
"'See generally supra notes 23, 27-30 and accompanying text (noting that patentability
of genetic material is firmly established under United States law, although the technical
patentability requirements have been evolving).
2 9See, e.g., Molly A. Holman & Stephen R. Munzer, Intellectual Property Rights in
Genes and Gene Fragments: A Registration Solution for Expressed Sequence Tags, 85 IOWA L.
REV. 735, 735 (2000) (noting the intense controversy over the patentability of gene fragments,
including divergent opinions among academics on the issue); Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 558-
61 (providing a historical perspective of the controversy over corporate attempts to patent gene
sequences).
...See, eg., supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text (noting that although such material
is patentable under United States law, the approaches of other countries are not uniform).
Although some might suggest that the United States laws regarding patentability of isolated
genetic material should be subject to renewed scrutiny, such proposals are beyond the scope of
this paper. However, for an interesting discussion of utilizing a registration scheme, rather than
patentability, to reward innovation with respect to gene sequences, see Holman & Munzer,
supra note 249, at 813-20.
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with the broad patentability suggests that perhaps inventorship is
another important issue with respect to the patentability of a compound
that is isolated after performing routine steps and procedures.25 In
particular, although present law considers a wide variety of genetic
material patentable, equity arguments concerning genetic material
could potentially be accommodated through a revised definition of
inventorship.
In addition, reconceiving the inventorship of genetic material
might better reflect scientific norms. After all, scientists who are
capable of isolating and purifying patentable material often react
negatively to gene patents.252  In other words, scientists with the
capacity for creating patentable material question are often the very
individuals who question whether patents are appropriate.
Accordingly, perhaps it is time to reconsider whether the current
requirements of conception and reduction to practice within
biotechnology are consistent with inventorship policies, which tend to
favor those with creative vision, rather than those who labor
extensively.
Returning once again to the intuitive objections of patients, the
claim against allowing scientists to be inventors of isolated genetic
material could be considered as a claim that the current definition of
conception of such inventions is improper. Although patients may not
explicitly articulate a rationale for why scientist efforts are unworthy,
their objection could be conceived as a claim that the process of
isolating a natural gene and discovering the function of the gene still
lacks sufficient inventiveness to qualify for a patent and instead may
only reflect hard work. Although "hard work" is not a traditional
ground for denying patentability, it has been a basis for exclusion from
copyright protection. In particular, the United States Supreme Court
has held that work that is produced under the "sweat of the brow,"
without sufficient creative expression, fails to meet basic requirementsfor cpyrigt " 154
for copyright law. Copyright law requirements are very different
than patentability requirements, although most people think of
2 In addition, while the isolation of a gene may be unpredictable in terms of when or
even whether it will occur, the actual process that leads to the result is not a novel concept;
indeed, the process is more analogous to a game of trial and error.
252See, e.g., Auth, supra note 4, at 911 (questioning whether ESTs should be patentable).
Granted, scientists may have mixed feelings about patenting any compound because of the
potential negative ramifications for their own research. In addition, it is often difficult to
separate whether the objections are regarding patentability of the subject matter or the idea that
someone should be considered an inventor over the subject matter.
.
53See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text (explaining concepts of inventorship, as
well the underlying policy justifications).
2
"'Feist, 499 U.S. at 353.
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patentability as a higher threshold.255 In particular, any expression with
a modicum of creativity - not necessarily one that is new and
nonobvious - is copyrightable if it is fixed in a tangible medium from
which it can be perceived. 2 " Although copyright law rewards
creativity, rather than innovation, the two standards are analogous and
stem from the same constitutional clause.257
In addition, the Supreme Court's statements in the copyright
context are particularly important here because they suggest that
providing protection to material beyond the scope of the underlying
constitutional clause is impermissible.2 1  Accordingly, if the activities
of scientists who isolate and purify genetic material were to be re-
conceptualized as hard work, but nonetheless fail to be of sufficient
inventive quality to merit patent protection, this could require a
fundamental shift in patent laws.
Of course, it is acknowledged that this suggestion for a
reconsideration of patentability of isolated genetic material is a radical
proposition.2 9  Indeed, there is long-standing precedent within the
United States for considering isolated and purified genetic material to
be patentable, with inventorship going to the individual responsible for
conceiving of the actual chemical sequence of the isolated compound.26°
In addition, biotechnology companies who presently are rewarded with
255See, e.g, Robert R. Jones Assocs., Inc. v. Nino Homes, 858 F.2d 274, 278 (6th Cir.
1988) (noting that originality is easier to establish than novelty); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda
Fine Arts, 191 F. 2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951) (noting that satisfying the originality requirement of
copyright law is easier than the novelty requirement of patent law in light of the broader scope
of patent protection); 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, at 2.01 [A] (2002) (clarifying that it is "now
clearly established" that the originality required for copyright only requires independent
creation, but not novelty).
256See 17 U.S.C. 102(a) (2000); Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (stating that "the requisite level of
creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice").
... See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, 8., cl. 1.2"See Feist, 499 U.S. at 346-48.
259However, the suggestion for a re-conceptualization of the presumption that, when
isolated, a purified material may be "invented," may not be as radical considering the PTO's
changing position on the patentability of gene sequences themselves. For example, although the
PTO previously issued patents on gene fragments and genes of unknown function, the PTO did
respond to criticism that such patents failed to meet the requirement of utility under patent laws
by specifically amending its guidelines on utility to prevent isolated sequences of unknown
function from patentability. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text (regarding changing
definition of utility with respect to genes and gene fragments). Similarly, the PTO material for
its own patent examiners has suggested a narrow scope for gene fragments with respect to full
genes to reduce the likelihood of blocking power. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
Written Description Guidelines, at http://www.uspto.gov.
2
'6See supra notes 104-10 and accompanying text (explaining inventorship rules for
conception of chemical and genetic inventions).
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many patents under the current system would strongly resist such a
change. 61
However, bowing to the economic argument of biotechnology
companies is not only doctrinally improper, but also unnecessary. In
particular, it should be remembered that the frequent claim of
biotechnology companies that patents are critical to their survival is in
fact the same argument of database proponents who are currently
deprived of copyright protection, but seeking an alternative system of
262compensation. Accordingly, the suggestion is not to strip
biotechnology companies of all rights based upon their important work
in isolating genetic material, but rather to reconsider whether their
efforts are over-compensated and potentially even unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
It remains to be seen whether patients will be entitled to share in the
patent pot of gold that presently exists for isolated genetic material, or
whether there will even be a pot of gold to share. This article takes an
important step in defining the present concerns and misperceptions of
patient contributors. In addition, specific avenues have been outlined
to provide patients and their advocates with more options to achieve an
equitable result. In particular, the broad-based consideration of patient
contributor issues alongside analogous areas should foster a reasoned
discussion of incentives and a reconsideration of current norms to reach
a situation that better reflects and rewards patient contributors.
In addition, the multi-disciplinary approach of this article should
have continued value beyond the patient contributor situation.
Particularly in the area of biotechnology, there seem to be inherent
conflicts that arise from the patenting of material that has important
implications for both research and medical treatment. Although there
is a tendency to consider every conflict in isolation, this article suggests
a new framework for considering such conflicts that should hopefully
provide for more sustaining solutions. In addition to forestalling overly
narrow approaches, geared principally towards short-term solutions,
this approach is more likely to succeed on a global level because it
...See generally supra note I and accompanying text (describing the race to patent genes
because of lucrative profits).
.
6See supra notes 223, 227-28 and accompanying text (describing argument of database
proponents that legal protection analogous to copyright protection is necessary).
263 See Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The
Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119
(2000).
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inherently requires considerations of impacted parties other than those
currently in conflict.
The search for more broad-based solutions is critical for the future
development of patent law, including how it accommodates new
technology. After all, although the United States law concerning the
patentability of isolated genetic material may appear immutable, at one
point, this too was an area that was controversial and the ultimate
resolution could have been a very different one. The continuing
evolution of patent law and technologies it must accommodate will
require further consideration of novel issues. Accordingly, the
multidisciplinary approach outlined here may have continued validity
in future disputes regarding the patent pot of gold beyond resolving the
issues of patient contributors.

